Ethics and climate change policy by Lee, Peter
ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Peter Lee
With a foreword by Dr Peter Forster, Bishop of Chester
The Global Warming Policy Foundation
GWPF Essay 2
GWPF REPORTS
Views expressed in the publications of
the Global Warming Policy Foundation
are those of the authors, not those of
the GWPF, its Academic Advisory Coun-
cil members or its directors
THE GLOBAL WARMING POLICY FOUNDATION
Director
Benny Peiser
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Lord Lawson (Chairman) Sir Martin Jacomb
Lord Donoughue Baroness Nicholson
Lord Fellowes Lord Turnbull
Rt Revd Dr Peter Forster, Bishop of Chester Sir James Spooner
ACADEMIC ADVISORY COUNCIL
Professor David Henderson (Chairman) Professor Richard Lindzen
Adrian Berry Professor Ross McKitrick
Sir Samuel Brittan Professor Robert Mendelsohn
Sir Ian Byatt Professor Ian Plimer
Professor Robert Carter Professor Paul Reiter
Professor Vincent Courtillot Dr Matt Ridley
Professor Freeman Dyson Sir Alan Rudge
Professor Christopher Essex Professor Nir Shaviv
Christian Gerondeau Professor Philip Stott
Dr Indur Goklany Professor Henrik Svensmark
Professor William Happer Professor Richard Tol
Professor Terence Kealey Professor Fritz Vahrenholt
Professor Deepak Lal Dr David Whitehouse
ETHICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY
Peter Lee
ISBN 978-0-9573880-5-5
c© Copyright 2014 The Global Warming Policy Foundation

Contents
About the author ii
Foreword iii
1 Introduction 1
2 Science, ethics and climate policy 5
Emerging scientific concern 5
Science, normality and ethics 8
Consensus 10
Science, consensus and politics 13
Lobbying and activism 15
3 Shaping climate policy 17
Competing priorities 17
The ethics of growth and sustainability 20
Negotiating climate policy 23
4 Setting climate policy 26
The precautionary principle 26
The ethics of decarbonising 29
Ethics and uncertainty 33
The moral hazard warning 38
5 Conclusion 43
6 Acknowledgements 45
i
About the author
Dr Peter Lee is a principal lecturer in ethics and political theory at the University
of Portsmouth. He specialises in the politics and ethics of war and military
intervention, the ethics of remotely piloted aircraft (drone) operations, and
the politics and ethics of identity. He is the author of Truth Wars: The Politics of
Climate Change, Military Intervention and Financial Crisis.
ii
Foreword
By Peter Forster, Bishop of Chester
Peter Lee’s essay on the ethics of climate change policy is to be warmly wel-
comed as a substantial contribution to a debate that proponents of the IPCC
scientific consensus appear to wish to close down.
My own interest in the scientific and ethical issues surrounding climate
change (whatever one means by that deceptively simple phrase) arose from a
surprise that climate scientists were so confidently predicting climate condi-
tions several decades hence. My background is as a chemist, and in my sub-
sequent theological and ecclesiastical career I have devoted considerable at-
tention to the history of science as a cultural force, as well as trying to keep
abreast of major developments in science itself. The work of Thomas Kuhn
and Michael Polanyi had demonstrated the ways in which a theoretical con-
sensus can develop and reinforce itself, precisely in the face of criticism that
later proves to be valid. This is a phenomenon that is not confined to the natu-
ral sciences, but arises in every area of learning, for example economics, where
evidential proof will eventually prove decisive.
While scientific theories are often developed on intuitive and expert spec-
ulative grounds, they have ultimately to answer at the bar of experimental ev-
idence. A year or so ago I was fortunate to be present in the physics depart-
ment of one of our leading universities, when the professors were discussing
their current work. A professor of theoretical physics outlined the latest ideas
about aspects of fundamental physics, string theory and so on, backed up by
complex models embedded in a huge array of computers, which filled a room.
The professor of experimental physics wryly commented that if an experiment
could be devised to test such theories, he would gladly do so.
That is how scientific certainty, such as it ever is certain, is established. In
2015 we will celebrate the centenary of Einstein’s 1915 paper on general rela-
tivity, but it was only when Sir Arthur Eddington’s 1919 expeditions to the Gulf
of Guinea and Brazil to observe a total eclipse of the sun led to experimental
confirmation of the bending of light by a heavy object that the theory became
widely accepted. Many additional empirical confirmations have followed.
This point reverberates through Dr Lee’s essay. Evidence and proof un-
dergird intrinsically moral questions, if hundreds of billions or even trillions of
public expenditure are at stake, and many millions of lives would be adversely
affected and much avoidable poverty generated by the wrong global policy
decisions. What experimental support, beyond sophisticated computer pro-
jections, exists of the theories behind the current IPCC consensus? What proof
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can exist? It should be acknowledged, of course, that the case for increasing
carbon dioxide concentrations having a forcing effect upon global tempera-
tures is very strong, but the quantitative link between carbon dioxide levels
and average temperature is very much less certain, as is the effect of other
influences on the long-term climate.
In order to predict the future climate a theoretical model is needed, one
which encompasses all events on the surface of the planet, events in the ocean
depths and in the atmosphere (clouds etc.), levels of carbon dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide, water and methane, and also events on the surface of the sun that are
determined by its interior. The outputs are then projected forward for many
decades.
The level of certainty, admittedly within various envelopes of uncertainty,
that has been expressed in the IPCC consensus is surprising, not least in the
face of the current, and entirely unpredicted, 18-year global standstill in av-
erage surface temperatures. The IPCC coolly refers to this as a hiatus, as if
such hiatuses are a rationally understood, normal part of science. They are not.
The overconfidence of the IPCC has blended rather easily with, and been rein-
forced by, the guilt-driven quasi-religious Western fervour to save the planet.
It is a short step to label those who question the IPCC certainties as climate
change deniers, with unpleasant echoes of holocaust denial.
It is agreed that even if catastrophic global warming does not result from
current trends in increases in carbon dioxide concentrations, the possibility
that it might do so demands that all necessary measures must be taken to
limit carbon dioxide emissions. This is called the precautionary principle. In a
central section of this essay Dr Lee demonstrates that invoking such a princi-
ple easily becomes a lazy substitute for rigorous argument and empirical evi-
dence.
We are entering a crucial phase of national and international debate, as the
clock ticks and successive political initiatives end in failure. The temptation to
raise the alarmist hyperbole is reminiscent of preachers and orators who note
alongside a weak section of their script: ‘Speak louder’.
The UK government has recently strengthened the legal framework to en-
able the maximum exploitation of its national hydrocarbon reserves, while
signed up to an IPCC consensus which, on its own terms, requires most of the
currently proven global reserves of oil and gas to remain in the ground. As
Martin Wolf concluded in the Financial Times on 18 June 2014: ‘The world has
got itself into an extremely contradictory place’.
Dr Lee’s essay explores these matters from the moral and ethical perspec-
tives that might arise. The issues can doubtless be argued in different ways,
but that they do need to be opened up for mature debate is vital for the future
of our society, given the huge expenditures of public money that are poten-
iv
tially involved. Democratic consent to whatever is decided will not be forth-
coming if the debate is not engaged in the depth which Dr Lee demonstrates
is necessary.
Rt Revd Dr Peter Forster
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Ethics and Climate Change Policy
1 Introduction
Ethics is about making choices, something everyone does every day. For the
idealist it is about choosing between good and evil, while for the pragmatist
it means choosing between lesser evils and greater evils. Politics is also about
making choices, and even though politicians will attempt as far as possible to
present themselves and their policies as ethical, the harsh realities of distribut-
ing limited resources, ideological differences and conflicting interests mean
that difficult and often apparently unethical choices must be made on a daily
basis. Into this morass of ethical aspiration and political realism in the govern-
ing of individuals and populations falls almost every activity and interest imag-
inable, few of which are as contentious as climate change and the policies that
are intended to ameliorate its worst effects. Complicating matters further, the
literature on climate ethics, like that of every other aspect of climate change,
is deeply contested, voluminous, rapidly expanding, and covers an array of
fields: moral philosophy, science, economics, public policy, global justice, en-
ergy, and human rights, among others.1 Some, like Henry Shue’s 1993 paper
on the costs, responsibility for, and allocation and prevention of greenhouse-
gas emissions, remain politically relevant after a series of global climate con-
ferences have failed to resolve them; others will remain in obscurity.2 Against
such a backdrop this essay, necessarily subjective, explores the complexity of
ethical decision-making in relation to climate change policy. The breadth of
the subject matter precludes a comprehensive engagement with the litera-
ture available at every juncture, so my selectivity is acknowledged even as the
reader is directed towards further reading.
The very use of the expression ‘climate change’ is problematic, with an eth-
ical dimension in the scientific and political spheres that goes beyond mere
description of a physical phenomenon. Its precursor of the 1980s and 1990s,
‘global warming’, still sits in the shadows of climate change: a central aspect
of the climate models produced on behalf of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) to shape government policy. One difference be-
tween global warming and climate change is that – to use the expression of
the philosopher of science Karl Popper3 – the former can be falsified while the
latter cannot. Popper argued that a scientific theory cannot be proven but it
1 An excellent starting point in the literature is Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale
Jamieson and Henry Shue (Ed.s) Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2010). This book provides a summary of the history of key elements of ethical
debates over two decades, not as a definitive text but as a prompt to further study (p. x).
2 Henry Shue, ‘Subsistence emissions and luxury emissions’ in Gardiner et al., Climate Ethics:
Essential Readings, pp. 200–214.
3 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford and New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 1979) p. 342.
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can be disproven. When applied to global warming/climate change, there are
circumstances in which it would be theoretically possible to show, through
measurement, that over a defined period the phrase ‘global surface tempera-
tures are rising’ is false (when that temperature stands still or falls). However,
there have been no circumstances in the history of planet Earth in which the
phrase ‘the global climate is changing’ can be shown to be false: the climate
has always changed, is changing, and will continue to change. ‘Global warm-
ing’ has become a source of frustration, embarrassment even, to some in the
climate science community, with actual measured global surface mean tem-
peratures not rising recently in ways consistent with expectations and predic-
tions at the end of the last century. 4 Climate change, on the other hand, is ap-
pealing to activists and politicians specifically because it is all-encompassing
and cannot be disproven. Nor can a human contribution to it be precisely mea-
sured and articulated. Going further, for some, climate change has developed
into a social phenomenon to be used to advance personal and political in-
terests and not a physical problem to be overcome. Mike Hulme, Professor of
Climate and Culture at King’s College London, captures this trend: ‘We will con-
tinue to create and tell new stories about climate change and mobilise these
stories in support of our projects’.5
Accompanying increasing scientific analysis of the physical aspects of cli-
mate change has been the emergence of Climate Change (note the capitali-
sation): an ideology – orthodoxy perhaps – that has emerged since the 1980s
and which comprises an interwoven network of scientific, political, philosoph-
ical, sociological and cultural claims.6 Alongside the emergence and growing
political influence of Climate Change (the ideology) has been an increasingly
aggressive polarisation of debate, with contending voices each claiming the
moral high ground.7 On this discursive battlefield it has become accepted
practice – often among people who should know better – to foster negative at-
titudes that are characterised by a failure to recognise or acknowledge where
opponents make valid points or ask legitimate questions. The consequence
is a dilution of truth on all sides, with claims and counter-claims frequently
4 Further details available at ‘Global-average temperature records’, Met Office, http://www.
metoffice.gov.uk/climate-guide/science/temp-records, accessed 10 October 2014.
5 Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree About Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction
and Opportunity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. 364.
6 For an extended analysis of several of the key points addressed in this article, especially the
role of truth in political discourse, see Peter Lee (forthcoming), Truth Wars: The Politics of
Climate Change, Military Intervention and Financial Crisis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014).
7 While the terms ‘moral’ and ‘ethical’ will be used throughout this work, the former is taken
to broadly refer to broad principles or societal codes while the latter concerns individual
choices made in relation to those codes or principles.
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being overstated and under-justified, thereby creating ethical dilemmas for
everyone who is interested in making decisions about the future of our planet
and the welfare of its occupants, human and otherwise. In turn, this leads to a
loss of interest and trust in scientific claims on climate issues by citizens around
the world who might otherwise be more engaged with a subject that affects
everyone.
Every aspect of climate change is shaped by ethical dispute: from scientific
practice to lobbying and activism and eventually, at national and international
levels, the setting and implementation of climate policy. The protagonists at
every stage will claim that theirs is the ethical, or more ethical, position, and
for a number of reasons. Some will claim to base their arguments and actions
on superior values – secular or religious – than their opponents; others will
claim that their motives are somehow purer, better informed and more altru-
istic than their selfish adversaries. Yet others will resolutely claim to be doing
‘the right thing’, an essentially meaningless catch-all that suggests a moral su-
periority without supplying persuasive evidence by way of justification. Oth-
ers again will concern themselves with altering a predicted or imagined future
without fully understanding the implications of their actions in the present or
the interim.
Further complicating ethical claim and counter-claim is the disputed na-
ture of ethics itself and the numerous, apparently contradictory, competing
ethical frameworks that can be applied to climate change policy and every
other aspect of life. To highlight these complexities and contradictions, and
to offer a range of ethical interpretations, this paper will use two contrasting
ethical approaches to show how easy it is to construct an apparently iron-clad
ethical argument by either deliberately or inadvertently overlooking alterna-
tive perspectives. The two approaches that will be used in making ethical as-
sessments in the sections to follow attach different levels of importance to
the ‘ends’ or outcomes that are being pursued – say, saving the world from
climate-induced disaster – and the ‘means’ adopted by scientists, activists,
vested interests and politicians in the process. The former approach usually
seeks the greatest amount of good for the highest number of people in any
eventual outcome. In addition, individual motivation will also be considered,
arguing that good motives do not always lead to good outcomes.8 Motivation
is considered, at least in part, because if someone is motivated to ‘save’ the en-
vironment – however they articulate such a goal – above all things, he or she
might be willing to accept a degree of human suffering as a result of climate
change policy that would not be countenanced by someone who is primarily
8 See Robert Merrihew Adams, ‘On motives and morals’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No.
14 (Aug 1976) p. 470.
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motivated to improve the lives of the global poor. This differentiation of mo-
tivations is based on the understanding that ‘the environment’ is represented
in different ways in climate change discourse: for some it is the essential habi-
tat of humanity with the future of both being inextricably linked; for others
‘the environment’ is more like some imagined ideal like, say, a biblical ‘Eden’
unspoiled by humans, than the harsh landscape of human history. These of-
ten unstated assumptions shape attitudes, intentions and behaviour towards
the ethical dimension of climate change policy.
The alternative approach is duty- or rule-based and concerned with behav-
ing properly – conforming to laws, policies, codes and so on – in the process
of deciding and acting. To give an example of what this might mean, a climate
scientist whose priority is to shape government policy in pursuit of the aim of
‘saving the planet’ may well behave differently to one whose absolute priority
is maintaining the purity of long-established conventions of scientific practice,
regardless of whether the outcomes advantage or disadvantage a certain pol-
icy position on climate change. The extent to which the integrity of science
and the scientific method is maintained in relation to climate change will be
examined.
One further ethical consideration that will appear in the pages to follow
is that of unintended consequences, and it is concerned with the relationship
between the intentions of individuals (I will extend this to groups) when they
pursue a particular course of action, and the outcomes that result. Where
climate change is concerned, good intentions should not immunise any in-
terested party from criticism if their actions lead to deleterious outcomes for
communities, countries and the world as a whole.
With these considerations in mind, the remainder of this paper will address
the ethical dimension of three aspects of climate change policy. Section 2 will
examine the ethical aspects of the scientific practice that both prompted the
need for, and continues to shape at national and international levels, climate
change policies. The tension between scientific activism and established sci-
entific moral codes built on objective disinterest will be considered alongside
the implications of unquestioningly accepting or rejecting scientific consen-
sus, before moving on to explore the ethical dimensions of lobbying and ac-
tivism more broadly. Section 3 will explore several ethical dilemmas involved
in shaping climate change policy: the relative importance of human welfare
and the environment, especially with regard to the global poor; the trade-off
between harms and benefits in the pursuit, or limiting, of economic growth;
and the practical difficulties involved in climate change negotiations. The final
section will explore some of the ethical challenges in setting climate policy by
analysing the costs of a simplistic application of the precautionary principle.
Present needs will be considered against the needs of future generations in
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both human and environmental terms, highlighting the difficulty of taking an
ethical stance. The merits of global-scale mitigation solutions – for example,
decarbonisation, carbon trading, and green taxes – will be weighed against
targeted and specific adaptation, while the relative ethical claims of idealism
(what should be done in a perfect world) will be considered alongside polit-
ical pragmatism (what can be done in our imperfect world). Further, ethical
decision-making amidst differing levels of uncertainty will be considered and
then, finally, the dangers of moral hazard: a phenomenon that occurs when
the best of intentions, motivations and actions combine to bring about out-
comes that make the initial situation worse.
2 Science, ethics and climate policy
Emerging scientific concern
The emergence of global warming/climate change as an area of scientific in-
terest is familiar enough to anyone with more than a passing interest in the
subject. However, since science has been at the forefront of both prompting
and sustaining climate change as an area of social and political concern it is
worth very briefly recalling some early waypoints before turning to an ethical
analysis of the contribution of contemporary climate science to climate pol-
icy.9
The mathematician and scientist Jean-Baptiste Joseph Fourier is usually
cited as making the first significant contribution to our understanding of how
global mean temperature is influenced by the atmosphere.10 Though Fourier
published an article in 1824 in which he discussed different aspects of the
heating of the Earth, James Fleming’s history of climate change and human
contributions to it shows that Fourier and others had been exploring this field
for some years previously.11 The scientific principles and activities that un-
derpinned Enlightenment progress and confidence opened up new concep-
tual and technological frontiers: observation, measurement, objective anal-
ysis, the testing of hypotheses through experimentation, replication of find-
ings, peer review through public lectures and published works. These were
applied to the study of climate just as they were applied in every other area of
9 For a comprehensive treatment of the history of global warming/ climate change see Ru-
pert Darwall, The Age of Global Warming: A History (London: Quartet Books, 2013).
10 For example, see Hulme, 2011, p. 42 ff.
11 For an extensive study of early scientific explorations of climate change see James R. Flem-
ing, Historical Perspectives on Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and
James R. Fleming, ‘Joseph Fourier, the ‘greenhouse effect’, and the quest for a universal the-
ory of terrestrial temperatures’, Endeavour Vol. 23, No. 2 (1999) pp. 72ff.
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the natural sciences. In the course of the nineteenth century, understanding
of the extent of natural variation in the Earth’s climate would eventually lead to
the acceptance of early ice ages. Continuous scientific study produced both
new understandings and new questions to be explored. By the turn of the
twentieth century a link had been established between carbon dioxide levels
in the atmosphere and global mean surface temperature.
Disputes still rage over the extent to which fears of a looming ice age dom-
inated climate science in the early 1970s. What is beyond dispute is that by
the end of that decade the subject was dominated by concerns about global
warming and its potential influence on life on Earth.
Equally indisputable is the gradual merging of climate science with politi-
cal concern. By 1989 the distinction between the objective pursuit of scientific
knowledge about global warming and the politics of science-based climate
activism had broken down to the extent that Professor Stephen Schneider, an
early lead author for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
could write:
On the one hand, as scientists we are ethically bound to the scientific
method, in effect promising to tell the truth, the whole truth, and noth-
ing but – which means that we must include all doubts, the caveats, the
ifs, ands and buts. On the other hand, we are not just scientists but hu-
man beings as well. And like most people we’d like to see the world a bet-
ter place, which in this context translates into our working to reduce the
risk of potentially disastrous climate change. To do that we need to get
some broad based support, to capture the public’s imagination. That,
of course, means getting loads of media coverage. So we have to offer
up scary scenarios, make simplified, dramatic statements, and make lit-
tle mention of any doubts we might have. This ‘double ethical bind’ we
frequently find ourselves in cannot be solved by any formula. Each of
us has to decide what the right balance is between being effective and
being honest. I hope that means being both.12
Schneider’s words have since been fought over, selectively redacted and
sometimes misrepresented by climate change advocates and opponents alike
– alarmists and sceptics, in their extreme forms. For the latter, the claim that
climate scientists ‘have to offer up scary scenarios [and] make simplified, dra-
matic statements,’ is taken to be an admission of fraud. On some level it may
well be, but it is also a statement of great candour that gets to the heart of the
relationship between climate science, ethics and climate policy.
12 Stephen H. Schneider, October 1989 interview with Discover magazine, reprinted in De-
troit News Editorial Response, 5 December 1989, http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/
Publications/PDF Papers/DetroitNews.pdf, accessed 31 July 2014.
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In ethical terms, the two most significant phrases set out by Schneider
are these: ‘As scientists we are ethically bound to the scientific method’, and,
‘we’d like to see the world a better place’. The first of these statements ac-
knowledges the ethical code that defines the scientific method which, accord-
ing to Robert Merton’s enduring account, comprises universalism, communal-
ism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism;13 in other words that science
is conducted using universally accepted practices and criteria, that findings
should be shared by all scientists and not narrow communities, that scientists
should prioritise the testing, replication and verification of results above any
pecuniary or other self-interest, and that findings should be continuously and
rigorously scrutinised. This approach considers that scientists conduct them-
selves ethically when they conform to established scientific codes. In contrast,
the second statement articulates a desire to ‘see the world a better place’ and
its ethical concern is with ends: what Schneider and those who support his
approach ultimately want to achieve through their scientific endeavour. This
approach allows, perhaps incites, scientists to veer away from the traditional
standards and practices of science embraced by Merton. There is a danger,
however, for those whose priority is achieving what they see as the ‘correct’
political as opposed to scientific ends (based on personal values, interests and
motivations); established scientific processes, codes and balanced consider-
ations can be marginalised or ignored, eventually leading to the ends being
used to justify questionable means.
Consequently, Schneider’s description of climate scientists being in a ‘dou-
ble ethical bind’ is inaccurate. Climate scientists face an ethical choice: do they
conform to established ethical standards of scientific practice or do they sac-
rifice those standards in favour of actions and statements that will be more
likely to shape public opinion and climate policy in their preferred direction?
For scientists there is no such thing as a balance between ‘being effective and
being honest’; once scientific honesty is violated it damages trust to the extent
that it can undermine any good intentions and negate anticipated effective-
ness in the long run.14 It is theoretically possible to be both, but not in Schnei-
der’s terms. Omitting the ‘doubts, the caveats, the ifs, ands and buts’15 is not
a morally neutral act; it is a subtle deception that calls scientific practice into
disrepute. If such actions took place in any other field, for example pharma-
ceutical research and the testing of new medicines, the scientists would not
only be branded unethical but would most likely be stripped of their positions
13 Robert K. Merton, 1942, ‘The normative structure of science’, in Norman W. Storer (ed.) The
Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1973) pp. 267–278.
14 Schneider, 1989.
15 Schneider 1989.
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and potentially face prosecution as well. Similarly, a scientist who was funded
by an oil or tobacco company and went on to ‘prove’ that their products were
harmless would be ridiculed and ignored. However, Schneider’s words in 1989
have served as an invitation to climate scientists to dilute or violate the ethics
of scientific practice while – and this is important to grasp – viewing their ac-
tions as ethical because of a desire to make the world a better place. The irony
here is that some climate scientists may be undermining their own arguments
by adopting such an approach.
For policymakers these details matter, for they need to know if they are
acting on the best of scientific knowledge, acquired through the application
of the most rigorous of scientific practices and observation of scientific ethics,
or whether well-intentioned scientist-activists are shaping climate policy on
the basis of less-than-transparent scientific practices – and I refer here to even
minor oversights or the exclusion of seemingly trivial caveats that may take
on great importance in an unpredicted future – and unstated personal and
political aims. Unfortunately for everyone concerned with climate change, re-
gardless of individual views about the degree to which it is prompted by hu-
man conduct or a result of natural variation, it only takes a small number of
high profile errors or examples of malpractice to undermine everyone’s trust:
a crucial point when billions, perhaps trillions, of pounds and dollars could be
spent erroneously.
Science, normality and ethics
Two ways to get round the ‘problem’ of the constraints of established science
ethics in the shaping of climate policy are, first, to redefine the very meaning
of science and, second, to change the moral code on which it rests, replacing
‘proof’ with ‘consensus’ in the process.
Four years after Schneider’s now (in)famous statement, two philosophers
of science, Silvio Funtowicz and Jerry Ravetz, challenged the rigid methodol-
ogy and codes of science in framing what Ravetz calls, ‘the scheme of Post-
Normal Science’.16 The purpose of post-normal science, especially in environ-
mental or climate studies, was to broaden the range of inputs into the policy-
making process, so as to include not only accredited scientists and the rigid
rules of science but also ‘all the stakeholders in an issue’ who, in turn, could
‘deploy “extended facts”, including local and personal experience’ and uncon-
ventional sources of information.17 As a result, the science – or rather post-
normal science – that would shape climate policy would incorporate subjec-
tive dimensions, individual and collective special interests, and ideological el-
16 Jerry Ravetz, http://www.jerryravetz.co.uk/work.html, accessed 31 July 2014.
17 Ibid.
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ements.18 Facts would be combined with values in driving social change.19
The attraction of this philosophical approach for some climate scientists is ob-
vious: the old restrictions of the scientific method could be set aside, either
fractionally or completely, in the pursuit of personally or ideologically ‘higher’
goals.
However, what Funtowicz and Ravetz did not make clear is how this ethi-
cal sleight of hand would be achieved. The process is simplicity itself and the
ideas are as old as philosophy. The emphasis on codes, rules and practices
that have shaped ethical scientific practice from the earliest days of the En-
lightenment would be relegated in favour of a values-driven, ideologically-
motivated philosophy of science that emphasised instead the importance of
the ‘ends’ being pursued (which is itself a value judgement). In other words,
the concept of post-normal science provides a post-hoc philosophical justi-
fication of Schneider’s shift away from the strictures of established scientific
norms, all in the name of individualised conceptions of saving the planet or
making the world a better place (however these statements are interpreted). It
also helps to explain why climate change advocates, especially more extreme
alarmists, continue to make the accusation of ‘climate change denier’ against
individuals who might clearly and publicly acknowledge the existence of cli-
mate change and the science that underpins it but want to discuss the extent
to which it is induced by human behaviour, its likely consequences for planet
Earth, and the best way to ameliorate any threat. This phenomenon exists be-
cause the dispute is not based on science as it is historically understood but
on post-normal science, which includes values, subjective opinion and ideo-
logical dimensions. If aspects of the (pure) scientific argument are accepted
by critics – that is, climate change is real – those critics can still be constituted
as deniers or contrarians because they have not also accepted particular en-
vironmental and ideological positions that are frequently associated with cli-
mate change, which often have an anti-capitalist emphasis or incorporate an
unstated commitment to the global redistribution of wealth. As Hulme, elo-
quently and transparently put it: ‘we need to see how we can use the idea
of climate change – the matrix of ecological functions, power relationships,
cultural discourses and material flows that climate change reveals – to rethink
how we take forward our political, social, economic and personal projects over
18 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz. ‘Science for the post-normal age’, Futures Vol. 25,
No. 7 (1993) 739–755.
19 Silvio O. Funtowicz and Jerome R. Ravetz, 2003, ‘Post-normal science’, International Soci-
ety for Ecological Economics, p. 3–4, http://leopold.asu.edu/sustainability/sites/default/files/
Norton,percent20Postpercent20Normalpercent20Science,percent20Funtowicz 1.pdf, ac-
cessed 10 December 2013.
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the decades to come’.20 Climate change has moved beyond a physical phe-
nomenon to be addressed to being a sociological phenomenon that has been
inscribed with layers of political, ideological, cultural and neo-religious beliefs.
Consensus
In parallel with this philosophical shift emerged the increasingly influential
concept of ‘consensus’ in climate science, which in turn was, and is, a pow-
erful weapon when it comes to shaping climate policy. However, it is difficult
to imagine a concept that is less suited to describing scientific processes and
output than consensus. The most obvious problems with consensus concern
who it is that is agreeing and how that agreement is reached, with each aspect
bringing its own ethical challenges.
One of the little-acknowledged truths about climate science is that there
is no such thing as a ‘climate expert’ or a ‘climate change expert’; not if ‘ex-
pert’ is taken to refer to someone who publishes internationally recognised
research in relevant, world-class academic journals in their field, alongside re-
search and possibly teaching at credible academic institutions. This is not in-
tended as an insult to those who devote their lives to understanding global cli-
mate, the way it changes and has changed over time, and the causes of those
changes, past, present and predicted future. However, the way that science
and scientists work makes the observation accurate. Consider just some of
the specialist fields – and that word ‘specialist’ is at the heart of the problem
– involved in understanding climate change: geophysics, biochemistry, ma-
rine biology, microbiology, paleoclimatology, geology, crop science, soil sci-
ence, plant biology, environmental chemistry, physical chemistry, evolution-
ary biology, biostatistics, bacteriology, environmental bacteriology, parasitol-
ogy, statistics, solar astronomy, solar physics, geography, oceanography, me-
teorology, plate tectonics, zoology, botany, computer science, atmospheric
science, biogeochemistry, helioseismology, climatology, history of the climate,
mathematical modelling, dendrochronology, stratospheric and tropospheric
chemistry, volcanology, hydroclimatology, glaciology and hydrometeorology.
It can take a lifetime for a scientist to become eminent in one field of study;
the chances of becoming eminent today in two or three fields are vanishingly
small. A solar physicist is unlikely to also be a pioneering bacteriologist and
a world leader in paleoclimatology. Of course, a well-educated scientist will
probably have a better appreciation of other fields than non-scientists but that
general understanding will never match their expertise in their own speciality.
This means that when scientists are reaching consensus on climate change –
and there appears to be little alternative to trying to understand what other
20 Hulme, 2011, p. 362.
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experts working in the general area of climatology are doing – they do so pre-
dominantly from a position of limited knowledge of other disciplines, since
theirs is one specialty out of dozens or even hundreds. This makes ethical ac-
countability somewhat difficult. In addition, if large numbers of climate sci-
entists share social, political or ideological values, as well as similar views on
how climate change should be ameliorated, there is an unavoidable risk of
well-intended groupthink21 on a global scale. Problematically, another ques-
tion emerges concerning the very basis of scientific inquiry: how possible is
it for long-established climate scientists to query even the smallest part of a
carefully constructed consensus?
Consider two examples of coercive behaviour that specifically sought to
maintain scientific consensus over climate change. The first concerns the me-
teorologist Professor Lennart Bengtsson, Head of Research at the European
Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts in Hamburg, a scientist of more
than 40 years experience, who accepted an invitation to join the Academic
Advisory Council of the Global Warming Policy Foundation on 27 April 2014.
Within two weeks he tendered his resignation, stating:
I have been put under such an enormous group pressure in recent days
from all over the world that has become virtually unbearable to me. . . I
had not expecting [sic] such an enormous world-wide pressure put at me
from a community that I have been close to all my active life. Colleagues
are withdrawing their support, other colleagues are withdrawing from
joint authorship etc. I see no limit and end to what will happen. It is a
situation that reminds me about the time of McCarthy.22
Bengtsson had not abandoned his life’s work to consort with a climate-
change denying ‘enemy’, he had decided to engage positively with an organ-
isation that is as committed to and supportive of, the enduring principles of
science and their application in climate research as the most assiduous climate
researcher. However, those involved with the organisation tend not to be wed-
ded to the same ideologies and policy solutions as many within what might
21 For an introduction to the phenomenon of groupthink and how it becomes extremely dif-
ficult for members of a group to challenge collectively owned ideas see Irving L. Janis, Vic-
tims of Groupthink: a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1972); and Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy De-
cisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). For an environmental application
of groupthink see Mark Pelling, Chris High, John Dearing, and Denis Smith, ‘Shadow spaces
for social learning: a relational understanding of adaptive capacity to climate change within
organisations’, Environment and Planning A, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2008) pp. 867–884.
22 Lennart Bengtsson, 14 May 2014, Letter of resignation to the GWPF Academic Advisory
Council, http://www.thegwpf.org/lennart-bengtsson-resigns-gwpf-voices-shock-and-
concern-at-the-extent-of-intolerance-within-the-climate-science-community/, accessed
2 August 2014.
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be termed the IPCC scientific consensus. Bengtsson was prepared to keep an
open mind, in the best of scientific traditions. However, science is not at the
root of the emotional blackmail, career threats and personal abuse that he re-
ceived: his treatment is more akin to that meted out to heretics of old. He
did not violate the principles of science but in the eyes of a number of hos-
tile individuals he betrayed the values, ideology and community cohesion of
a particular worldview that is expressed in what is for some the ‘climate cause’.
A tension exists at the heart of climate policy ethics: does climate consen-
sus emerge purely from the application of science, traditionally understood,
which then shapes policy, or does political and ideological agreement about
what climate policy should be encourage scientists to depart from the strict
methods that maintains the integrity of science? Hulme’s statement about us-
ing ‘the idea of climate change – to rethink how we take forward our political,
social, economic and personal projects over the decades to come’ highlights
the risk to established scientific method.23 This ideological aspect of climate
change was largely overlooked when the Climategate emails were leaked and
critics poured over the texts looking for evidence of scientific fraud. Such crit-
ics looked in vain for a ‘smoking gun’ that proved global-scale cheating. It was
not in the measuring, calculating and experimenting that the moral codes of
science were violated, it was in the politicising of scientific actions, as histori-
cal scientific disinterestedness was sacrificed in what was intended by some,
perhaps many, climate scientists as the pursuit of a noble, ethical cause.
In 2004 Michael Mann, the scientist behind the now (in)famous ‘hockey
stick’ graph,24 which showed fluctuations in the Earth’s temperature over the
last millennium, emailed Phil Jones at the Climatic Research Unit, University
of East Anglia, about an even longer historical temperature reconstruction.
The leaked email records him as writing: ‘By the way, when is Tom C going
to formally publish his roughly 1500 year reconstruction??? It would help the
cause to be able to refer to that reconstruction as confirming Mann and Jones,
etc’.25 The science – the temperature reconstruction – supports Mann’s cause,
opening him and other like-minded scientists to the charge that the cause
also shapes their science. This interpretation of Mann’s climate activism is re-
inforced in his published writings where he states: ‘Scientific truth alone is not
enough to carry the day in the court of public opinion. The effectiveness of
one’s messaging and the resources available to support and amplify it play a
23 Hulme, 2011, p. 362.
24 The graph was published in the Summary for Policymakers in the 2001 report of the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, see http://www.grida.no/publications/other/
ipcc tar/?src=/climate/ipcc tar/wg1/005.htm, accessed 1 August 2014.
25 Michael Mann, 3 August 2004, email to Phil Jones located at http://www.ecowho.com/foia.
php?file=3115.txt, accessed 19 July 2014, (my emphasis).
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far greater, perhaps even dominant role’.26 In ethical terms we see another
example of a climate scientist who holds a strong ethical commitment to the
policy dimension of climate change and its associated end of shaping public
opinion and behaviour, appearing to prioritise the pursuit of those ends above
the narrower moral codes of scientific discovery.
Science, consensus and politics
The matter of consensus and the degree to which it has been fully and freely
reached and continues to be fully and freely held by scientists involved in cli-
mate research is impossible to ascertain. The possibility of climate consen-
sus in the scientific domain being extended to the political domain is even
more problematic. Consider a number of statements from one United Na-
tions debate. On 17 April 2007 the UN Security Council hosted a debate on
climate change and its future implications, with the issue of ‘consensus’ ap-
pearing repeatedly. Jan Kubis, the Slovakian representative, gave consensus
an early mention in the debate, stating that ‘there was now an effective con-
sensus among the world’s leading scientists that there was a discernible hu-
man influence on the climate and a link between the concentration of carbon
dioxide and the increase in temperature [and that it] was time to consider the
policy dimensions of climate change’.27 Kubis suggested that the scientific as-
pects of climate change consensus was distinct from any suggested policy di-
mension that climate scientists put forward. However, in that same year the
IPCC acknowledged: ‘The quantitative and mechanistic explanation of. . .CO2
variations [over time] remains one of the major unsolved questions in climate
research.’28
L.K. Christian of Ghana grasped that the science and politics of climate
change were not distinct, asking: ‘What sorts of compromises would devel-
oping countries be obliged to make, in line with the emergent international
consensus on energy, security and climate change?’29 The inference here was
that emerging climate change consensus is something that is ‘done to’ devel-
26 Michael E. Mann, The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars (New York and Chichester: Columbia
University Press, 2012) p. 254.
27 UN Security Council Debate on the Impact of Climate Change, 17 April 2007, located at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9000.doc.htm, accessed 31 July 2014.
28 Jansen, E., J. Overpeck, K.R. Briffa, J.-C. Duplessy, F. Joos, V. Masson-Delmotte, D. Olago, B.
Otto-Bliesner, W.R. Peltier, S. Rahmstorf, R. Ramesh, D. Raynaud, D. Rind, O. Solomina, R. Vil-
lalba and D. Zhang, 2007: ‘Palaeoclimate’. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis,
K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, p. 446.
29 UN Security Council Debate, 17 April 2007.
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oping countries by developed countries. The Summary for Policymakers of
the 2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report acknowledges the imbalance of con-
tributions to climate science between developed and developing countries,
highlighting that the number of climate-science publications from the latter
‘still represents a small fraction of the total’.30
Bezlan Ishan Jenie, representing Indonesia, urged the international com-
munity to ‘seize the opportunity to reach a global consensus on ways to adapt
and mitigate climate change in the relevant fora’. These fora included the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Proto-
col, and the thirteenth Conference of the Parties of the Climate Change Con-
vention in Bali later that year. These policy-shaping fora have one thing in
common: a reliance on the claimed scientific consensus on climate change.
However, consensus can only be reached – bearing in mind that everyone is a
non-expert in every field but their own – through simplification, the marginali-
sation or exclusion of outlying views, and a tendency to some lowest common
denominator that the maximum number of scientists can sign up to: a politi-
cal, not a scientific process.
In the light of Schneider’s early urgings to ‘make simplified, dramatic state-
ments, and make little mention of any doubts we might have,’31 climate sci-
entists who want to stick rigidly to the core practices of science are put in a
difficult position when caveats and cautions are downplayed. As recently as
the 2014 IPCC Working Group III Summary for Policymakers the limitations of
climate models in planning mitigation policies are relegated to a footnote:
The long-term scenarios assessed in WGIII were generated primarily by
large-scale, integrated models that project many key characteristics of
mitigation pathways to mid-century and beyond. . .They are simplified,
stylized representations of highly-complex, real-world processes, and the
scenarios they produce are based on uncertain projections about key
events and drivers over often century-long timescales. Simplifications
and differences in assumptions are the reason why output generated
from different models, or versions of the same model, can differ, and
projections from all models can differ considerably from the reality that
unfolds.32
30 IPCC WGII AR5 Summary for Policymakers, 31 March 2014, p. 4.
31 Schneider, 1989.
32 IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers, In: Climate Change 2014, Mitigation of Climate
Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Fara-
hani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, C. von Stechow, T.
Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and
New York, NY, USA, p. 10, Footnote 14 (Italics for emphasis), http://report.mitigation2014.
org/spm/ipcc wg3 ar5 summary-for-policymakers approved.pdf, accessed 30 July 2014.
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There is nothing surprising or controversial in this statement; it conforms
to standard academic practice across all fields by being included as a footnote,
providing additional, relevant detail that would otherwise disrupt the flow of
the main argument. However, this is no mere academic article. It is a sum-
mary for policymakers that will guide them in their planning and execution of
key national and global policies to mitigate and adapt to climate change, with
potential costs of hundreds of billions or trillions of pounds over the rest of
the century. Given the vast potential costs involved and the subsequent im-
pact on current and future generations – especially the poorest – relegating
the important question of who will bear that cost to a footnote on page 10
is not simply an academic convention, it is a political act with ethical conse-
quences. Its relevance and impact would be very different if it was presented
as the opening statement in the Summary document. However, its positioning
is part of the ‘consensus’ reached in the policy document; it did not happen
by accident.
That is why the scientific consensus on climate change and the way it is
reached and sustained has such crucial ethical implications for climate policy-
making. It is not just scientific measurements, calculations, projections and so
on that inform policymakers. The additional layers of often unacknowledged
personal values, ideologies and collective aims are now part of the claimed
scientific consensus too and these factors make it difficult to have robust but
respectful disagreements: to question the science is to question the values
of the scientists behind it; to question related ideological aspects of climate
science held by scientists is deemed as questioning the science. What is not
clear is how individuals or groups within the consensus can question or chal-
lenge the consensus in keeping with time-honoured scientific practice. If such
challenges cannot be made and sustained without the abuse and coercion
faced by Lennart Bengtsson, for example, then what is taking place is a politi-
cal rather than a scientific process.
Lobbying and activism
The final link between climate science, climate policy, consensus and associ-
ated ethical considerations to be considered here takes the form of activism
and political lobbying. There are no established codes to govern either and the
guiding ethics, if they can be described this way, appear to be driven either by
the pursuit of an anticipated ‘good’ (in the case of activism) or in support of the
customer’s goals (in the case of lobbying). For the climate activist the antici-
pated ‘good’ – which may well turn out not to be so ‘good’ in due course – will
necessarily be ideologically informed and is not some automatic side effect
of scientific discovery. Meanwhile, political lobbyists are paid to get results:
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policy shifts in favour of the corporations or interests they represent, whether
that is for Greenpeace or BP. Such activities can be considered morally neutral,
insofar as they provide policymakers with information and arguments about
which they may not be aware, unless they result in harm, subvert the political
process or are actively misleading.
In 2010 David Cameron predicted, before he became Prime Minister, that
political lobbying would be the next major scandal in British politics, and this
is an ethical and legal time-bomb that is still ticking. In this ethically uncer-
tain terrain we find climate change lobbyist–activists who seek to reinforce ‘cli-
mate consensus’ in the public imagination with the aim of shaping human be-
haviour and the enactment of climate policy. The Institute for Public Policy Re-
search (IPPR) published a report in 2006, ‘as part of its project on how to stim-
ulate climate-friendly behaviour in the UK,’33 which raises ethical questions
about the relationship between climate science, activism and policy making. It
suggests how individual attitudes and behaviour in relation to climate change
might most effectively be influenced:
Much of the noise in the climate change discourse comes from argument
and counter-argument, and it is our recommendation that, at least for
popular communications, interested agencies now need to treat the ar-
gument as having been won. This means simply behaving as if climate
change exists and is real, and that individual actions are effective. . . The
‘facts’ need to be treated as being so taken-for-granted that they need
not be spoken. . .Where science is invoked, it now needs to be as ‘lay sci-
ence’ – offering lay explanations for what is being treated as a simple
established scientific fact, just as the earth’s rotation or the water cycle
are considered.34
For the IPPR there is no ethical case to answer here: it was commissioned to
prepare a report that would advise its customers how best to get a particular
‘climate friendly’ message across in such a way as to change behaviours. In de-
livering such a report its contractual and moral obligations – such as they ex-
isted – were fulfilled, even if the language is troubling in places for anyone con-
cerned with scientific accuracy and the cautions and caveats that accompany
ground-breaking scientific research. The IPPR urged the use of ‘non-rational
approaches like metaphor as well as more rationalistic approaches to enable
people to engage emotionally and make desired behaviours appear attrac-
tive.’35 Even the terminology – ‘non-rational’ – is anti-scientific.
33 Gill Ereaut and Nat Segnit, ‘Warm Words: How are we telling the climate story and can we
tell it better?’ (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 2006) p. 5.
34 Ibid., p. 25.
35 Ibid., p. 9.
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If climate consensus can only be achieved through negotiation, compro-
mise and acceptance of the lowest scientific denominator, promoted through
a further layer of simplification and explicit appeal to emotion over reason,
it is difficult to avoid the charge of propagating disinformation, even when
done with the best of intentions. Not only is the established moral code of nor-
mal science violated by overlooking scientific disinterestedness, but the pro-
motion of that consensus depends on techniques of ‘selling’ rather than per-
suading. Even the IPPR report acknowledges: ‘It amounts to treating climate-
friendly everyday activity as a brand that can be sold’.36 Should anyone seek to
ignore or diminish the significance of the IPPR approach, or deny that such ac-
tivities have never taken place, events at the BBC undermine their argument.
A 2007 report stated: ‘The BBC has held a high-level seminar with some of
the best [climate] scientific experts, and has come to the view that the weight
of evidence no longer justifies equal space being given to the opponents of
the consensus’.37 The BBC, when challenged over the veracity of this state-
ment went to inordinate lengths, including legal action, to prevent an accu-
rate description of the attendees from becoming public knowledge. Far from
being a gathering of ‘scientific experts’, the seminar was eventually shown to
have been a gathering of 28 BBC staff, a maximum of four scientists, and 26
others whose climate-related interests ranged from activism and campaign-
ing to lobbying and journalism.38 The real ethical dispute arises when climate
change advocates take the view that avoiding one specific, apocalyptic vision
of the future for our planet is so important and so urgent that ‘trivial’ inaccu-
racies in detail and argument such as those pointed out above can be over-
looked for the sake of some anticipated greater good: the ends justifying the
means.
3 Shaping climate policy
Competing priorities
In 1995 President Bill Clinton met with President Jiang Zemin of China in a
high-profile summit. Clinton is said to have informed the Chinese Premier
that his biggest fear for the United States was not war or trade imbalance
with China but that all Chinese people would want to live like Americans with
everything that such consumption implied for the environment and climate
36 Ibid., p. 28 (Original italics).
37 BBC Trust Report, June 2007, From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel: Safeguarding impartiality in
the 21st century, p. 40, located at http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/review
report research/impartiality 21century/report.pdf, accessed 28 July 2014.
38 For a more detailed outline of events see Peter Lee, Truth Wars, pp. 45–48.
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change.39 The Chinese leader, in contrast, was concerned with feeding a bil-
lion people and raising living standards. Further highlighting the distance be-
tween the two leaders in terms of climate concern, in describing the meeting
Mark Hertsgaard quoted a Chinese official as saying: ‘Global warming is not
on our agenda.’40
Superficially at least, the two dynamics at play here are first, concern for
people, especially people in poverty and facing hunger, as well as wider eco-
nomic and social deprivation, and second, concern for the natural environ-
ment, notably where it is harmed by human behaviour. Of course everyone
can and should be concerned for both other people and for the natural en-
vironment, especially since human existence necessarily depends on an envi-
ronment that will support and sustain the global population. However, cli-
mate change and the setting of climate policy may call for decisions to be
made about the relative importance of human welfare and the welfare of the
natural environment on which we depend. While it is theoretically possible to
apply equal weight to each it is more likely that greater priority will be given to
one over the other. Such a decision is not only a political choice, it is an ethical
choice as well since it involves placing higher or lower relative values on peo-
ple and the natural world and setting policy accordingly. (I accept that they
are inherently connected and that a reduction in Beijing’s smog will improve
the lives of the city’s inhabitants, for example.) While this may seem a rather
esoteric concern in a paper that is interested in the ethics of climate policy, the
connection is one of competing priorities.
In the 1970s the ecological movement began to gather a momentum that
would eventually bring it to global prominence through advocacy and ac-
tivism in addressing climate challenges and helping to advance pro-climate
change messages. Blunt sentiments from within the ecological movement at
that time left no doubt about where its priorities stood and where, for many,
they still stand. Edward Goldsmith, founder of The Ecologist in 1970, stated in
the first edition of the journal that the relationship between people and the
natural environment is akin to that of parasite and host: a ‘disease [that] has
spread exponentially’.41 Twenty years later the Club of Rome, a green collec-
tive, published a report that echoed Goldsmith’s sentiments:
In searching for a common enemy against whom we can unite, we came
up with the idea that pollution, the threat of global warming, water short-
ages, famine and the like, would fit the bill. In their totality and their in-
teractions these phenomena do constitute a common threat which must
39 An account of the meeting can be found at Mark Hertsgaard, ‘Is your stomach too full’, in
Bill McKibben (Ed.) The Global Warming Reader (New York, Penguin Books, 2011) p. 160.
40 Ibid.
41 Edward R.D. Goldsmith, Editorial, The Ecologist, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 1970) p. 3.
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be confronted by everyone together. All these dangers are caused by
human intervention in natural processes, and it is only through changed
attitudes and behaviour that they can be overcome. The real enemy then
is humanity itself.42
To those who view humanity as ‘the enemy’ it is easy to see why increased
energy costs and fuel poverty are ineffective arguments against some climate
change policies: humanity is getting what it deserves for what it has done to
the environment. Contrast those sentiments with a statement by Pope John
Paul, leader of the Roman Catholic Church, who, while identifying ecological
crises as ‘a moral problem’, said in 1990: ‘In the words of the Second Vati-
can Council [which clarified and re-asserted Roman Catholic doctrine in the
1960s], “God destined the earth and all it contains for the use of every indi-
vidual and all peoples”’.43 While the Catholic and other churches have more
recently voiced concerns for the natural environment, the history of scientific,
economic and technological advancement – especially in the West – has seen
the natural environment as a resource to be used for the benefit of the humans
who occupy it.
It should immediately be clear that individuals, organisations or govern-
ments who adopt an ideological stance that heavily prioritises the environ-
ment will be more prepared to enact climate policies that have a deleterious
impact on human beings than groups, religious or otherwise, whose ideolog-
ical roots prioritise human welfare. The greater the tendency to prioritise the
environment the more likely it is that the environment is viewed in romantic
or mythical terms completely separate from the people who live in it. People,
on the other hand, cannot be logically separated from the environment that
sustains them. However, when climate policies are proposed, debated and
decided upon by governments, observers will make more sense of decisions
if they can detect, even subtly, what the underlying philosophical or ideolog-
ical priorities are. With this crucial underlying consideration in mind, the re-
mainder of this section will explore two areas where choices must be made:
the ethics of economic growth and how it affects the poor, and in negotiating,
even discussing, climate policy.
42 Alexander King and Bertrand Schneider, The First Global Revolution: A Report by the Council
of the Club of Rome (Orient Longman, 1991) p. 75.
43 Pope John Paul II, 1 January 1990, Message for the Celebration of the World Day
of Peace, http://www.vatican.va/holy father/john paul ii/messages/peace/documents/hf
jp-ii mes 19891208 xxiii-world-day-for-peace en.html, accessed 1 August 2014.
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The ethics of growth and sustainability
Growth, or decline, in a nation’s economy is usually measured, annually, in
small percentage points of Gross Domestic Product, the total value of goods
produced and services provided over that period. In times of boom or reces-
sion, positive or negative growth might reach double figures, and measuring
those figures in pounds, dollars, euros or yen is the easy part. Calculating the
value of economic growth is another challenge entirely and is informed by per-
sonal, political and cultural influences. For some, economic growth is inher-
ently unethical: it harms the environment, is fuelled by the worst excesses of
human greed and selfishness, and the wealth it creates is unfairly distributed.
For others, economic growth is the key to meeting desperate needs by creat-
ing the wealth that will raise billions of people out of poverty. Complicating
matters, at every point on the political spectrum the notion of sustainability is
raised and disputed by environmentalists on the one hand and industrialists
on the other. Further, ‘sustainability’ as a concept is an important factor in this
discussion of ethics and climate change policy because it has been co-opted
into the ever-expanding doctrine and ideology of Climate Change, 44 and also
serves as a key argument for those who see the financial crisis of 2007–8 and
beyond as a signal that the end of economic growth is nigh.45
The UNFCCC and the earlier IPCC Summaries for Policymakers present an
apparently ethical ideal to the world that somehow enables the mitigation
(reduction) of greenhouse gases, facilitates sustainable economic growth and
eradicates poverty at the same time. The IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report in
2014 goes further than its predecessors in identifying the competing ethi-
cal claims and methodologies.46 Simon Caney, for example, has used human
rights and a combination of the ‘polluter pays’ and ‘ability to pay’ principles
in allocating the burden of costs and responsibilities.47 These approaches,
in turn, have been challenged by Martin Weitzman, who argues that ‘deep
structural uncertainty lies at the heart of climate change economics’.48 Robert
Pindyck goes further, factoring in potential future damages in his modelling.49
44 See Hulme, 2011, p. 248ff.
45 See Richard Heinberg, The End of Growth (Forest Row, Clairview Books, 2011) p. 222ff.
46 See IPCC WGIII AR5, Ch. 2, p. 28.
47 From an extensive author literature see Simon Caney, ‘Climate change, energy rights and
equality. Climate change’, in The Ethics of Global Climate Change. D. Arnold, (ed.), (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) pp.77–103; Simon Caney, ‘Climate change and
the duties of the advantaged’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy,
Vol. 13, Issue 1 (2010) pp. 203–228.
48 Martin L. Weitzman, ‘Fat-tailed uncertainty in the economics of catastrophic climate
change’, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy Vol. 5, Issue 2 (Summer 2011) p. 286.
49 Robert S. Pindyck, ‘Fat tails, thin tails, and climate change policy’, Review of Environmental
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The idea of sustainable development is not new and has been revisited
regularly since Thomas Malthus wrote An Essay on the Principle of Population
in 1798. The concept emerged in the lexicon of environmental politics in 1987
as ‘a process of change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of
investments, the orientation of technological development, and institutional
change’ are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to
meet human needs and aspirations.50 The idealism of Our Common Future and
its authors, revealed in these few words, does little to address the practical
challenges and ideological tensions the world faces now and will face in the
future. The Chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment behind the report began by fudging the question of sustainability and
its associated ethical dimension by calling for ‘a new era of economic growth –
growth that is forceful and at the same time socially and environmentally sus-
tainable’.51 As a goal this aspiration appears ethically indisputable: who would
not want economic growth that is both forceful and non-harmful. However,
in order to pursue that ethical ideal the proposer and any supporters have
to side-step two ethical implications of the means to achieve that goal. First,
‘forceful growth’ is not what the author suggests and actually means, or at
least suggests; ‘curtailed growth’ – another burden to be borne primarily by
the poor – would be more accurate. Second, the target of social and envi-
ronmental sustainability locates ethical priority with the natural environment
over people.
This message became a founding principle of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change and is articulated in Article 2:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instru-
ments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in ac-
cordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to
proceed in a sustainable manner.52
The Convention starts off by articulating a concern about how human be-
Economics and Policy, Vol. 5, Issue 2 (Summer 2011) p. 260.
50 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future,
1987, Chapter 2, Part I, para. 15, http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf,
accessed 2 August 2014.
51 Ibid., Chairman’s Foreword.
52 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Art. 2, http://unfccc.int/
essential background/convention/background/items/1353.php, accessed 4 August 2014.
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haviour has led to increased output of greenhouse gases which, in turn, ‘will
result on average in an additional warming of the Earth’s surface and atmo-
sphere and may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind’.53 How-
ever, it soon moves on from scientific concern about global warming to the
more political and politicized issue of sustainability, all without articulating
the obvious consequence that some people, somewhere, are going to be dis-
advantaged by the process. The political realities of compromise texts when
international treaties are framed has fixed the paradox of economic growth
and sustainability in the UNFCCC and other climate change organisations and
documents in a way that consistently stresses limits on economic growth –
with its implications for the poor – for the higher priority of the environment.
Having fudged the matter so consistently for so long, the ideal is perceived by
some, perhaps many, as ‘real’ because it is in the UNFCCC founding articles.
Consequently, many environmental campaigners repeatedly seem surprised
that when it comes down to hard-nosed climate-oriented economic negotia-
tions such as the 2009 Copenhagen conference, binding agreements cannot
be reached.
The most recent example of sustainability being co-opted into the climate
change agenda – a political desirability rather than a scientific necessity – can
be found in the Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment: ‘Sus-
tainable development and equity provide a basis for assessing climate policies
and highlight the need for addressing the risks of climate change’.54 Unlike the
more overtly idealised statement in Article 2 of the UNFCCC, there is at least
a hint that compromises will need to be made somewhere if sustainability –
which I take to mean limiting growth, underpinned by some degree of unspo-
ken anti-capitalism – is to flourish. Potentially major costs are acknowledged,
the report stating that mitigation activities could well come at the cost of the
goals of sustainable development and poverty reduction.55 This is weighed
against the risk that ‘sufficiently disruptive climate change could preclude any
prospect for a sustainable future’.56 ‘Sustainability’ discourses often discount
the future impacts of technological advances – which have happened con-
sistently throughout human history – and the effects that increasing scarcity
has on innovation and the pursuit of alternative resources. However, in the
Fifth Assessment document, the potential benefits of technical innovation are
acknowledged in ‘labour and resource productivity’ in support of economic
growth and reduced emissions.57 All of which adds layer upon layer of uncer-
53 Ibid., Preamble.
54 IPCC WGIII AR5 Summary for Policymakers, 31 March 2014, p. 5.
55 Ibid.
56 IPCC WG III, ‘Mitigation of Climate Change, AR5, Chapter 4, p. 4.
57 Ibid., Technical Summary, p. 19.
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tainty to the ethical dimension of climate change policy, compounded by is-
sues such as self-interest, national interest, ideological conviction, prioritising
of the present poor over the future poor or vice versa, the reliability of predic-
tive models (given that the current surface temperature warming ‘pause’ was
not loudly forecast in the 1990s) and the political constraints that manifest
most clearly during climate negotiations.
Negotiating climate policy
The UNFCCC and IPCC approach appears to have been that if the ethical ideal
of simultaneous sustainable growth and climate change mitigation and allevi-
ating poverty is written and spoken of frequently enough it will somehow be-
come ‘real’ without ever having to explicitly identify or make the tough policy
choices it demands. For when real-world political positioning is examined it
becomes very clear, very quickly that an ethical illusion has being constructed
and sustained through a lack of complete scientific honesty – publicising the
ifs, ands, buts, caveats and doubts surrounding climate research as loudly as
every other aspect – and political transparency of the part of policymakers.
Political practicalities quickly emerge when the hard policy discussions be-
gin and leaders conduct a cost–benefit analysis of climate change threat, miti-
gation and/or adaptation against every other economic, social, security, med-
ical and educational concern they face – in both the short and long terms.58
Revisiting the 2007 UN Security Council debate on climate change is revealing.
For example, Johan Verbeke of Belgium repeated the UNFCCC/IPCC ideal while
calling for the international community to ‘address the issue in an integrated
manner, which dealt with the need to promote growth, while, at the same
time, protecting the environment and reducing fossil fuel consumption’.59 In
contrast, L.K. Christian of Ghana cut to the heart of the matter, saying that ‘the
issue of climate change in Africa should be framed in terms of how to com-
bat the phenomenon without compromising the targeted 8 per cent growth
rate needed to reduce poverty’.60 Eight percent growth represents a target of
doubling the African economy in 9 years, emulating the growth rates achieved
in China over the past two decades.61 Christian also set out his challenge to
the developed countries of the world, asking what compromises developing
countries would be ‘obliged to make, in line with the emergent international
58 Like every other aspect of climate change, cost-benefit calculations are heavily contested
because they are value judgements rather than objective measures. See IPCC WGIII AR5
Technical Summary, p. 4 as a helpful starting point in IPCC considerations.
59 UN Security Council Debate on the Impact of Climate Change, 17 April 2007.
60 Ibid.
61 ‘GDP Growth Data’, The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.
ZG?page=4, accessed 15 August 2014.
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consensus on energy, security and climate change?’ The word ‘obliged’ is sig-
nificant. Would that be a moral, legal, social or political obligation or a combi-
nation thereof? And what does the emergent consensus look like?
Christian’s words echoed the confidence of then UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair, which would preface a clear shift in tone in climate change discourse
by his successor David Cameron. In 2006, Blair told a conference on climate
change and governance in Wellington, New Zealand:
I think in terms of the long term future there is no issue that is more
important than climate change. . .Climate change is not just an environ-
mental challenge, but is a threat to the global economy and to global
security. The projected rise in the global average temperature will have
catastrophic effects, increasing the frequency of extreme weather events
(floods, cyclones and hurricanes). Tackling climate change requires a
sustained global effort to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases through
cleaner energy, transport and changes in technology and behaviour.62
Blair’s confidence in the priority of climate change and the urgency of mit-
igation appeared absolute, and in the long term (centuries rather than five-
year electoral cycles) he may be proved correct. He was also clear in setting
out the all-encompassing extent of the global effort needed. It would be rea-
sonable to say that in the short term – the eight years since Blair’s speech –
climate change and environmental stress has not harmed the global economy
and security to any great extent. If anything, the opposite has occurred: the
economic crisis of 2007–8 and its fallout, together with concerns about en-
ergy security and the developmental needs of the poorest in the world, has set
back climate change as a political force in recent years. I have expressed the
view elsewhere that it was around 2006 or so that Climate Change reached its
zenith as an ideologically-informed and scientifically-supported political force.
After this the global financial crisis focused the world’s attention on the dif-
ficult political choices to be made: between tackling immediate and definite
economic emergencies and possible, ill-defined future climate-induced emer-
gencies.63 This view has been recently reinforced by absence of China’s Presi-
dent Xi Jinping, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and German Chancellor
Angela Merkel from the September 2014 UN Climate Summit in New York. Be-
tween them, these three represented the leaders of two of the world’s three
largest GHG-emitting nations and the leader of Europe’s largest economy.64
62 Tony Blair, 26 March 2006, Statement to the Climate Change and Governance Conference,
Wellington, located at http://tna.europarchive.org/20061101025041/http://www.fco.gov.
uk/servlet/Front/TextOnly?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=
1107298302322&to=true accessed 3 January 2014
63 See Peter Lee, Truth Wars.
64 The Guardian, 24 September 2014.
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Their priorities lay elsewhere.
David Cameron’s rise to prominence as, initially, leader of the Conservative
Party from 2005 and later as British Prime Minister from 2010 was accompa-
nied by strong and repeated declarations that environmentalism had become
a significant priority for him and that he wanted to preside over the ‘greenest
government ever’.65 By the end of 2013, as rising ‘green’ taxes were becoming
increasingly unpopular and helping to put more households into fuel poverty,
Cameron was widely reported as having told his advisers to ‘get rid of all the
green crap’ from energy bills.66 By 2014 Cameron’s government set out plans
to cut subsidies to the owners of wind farms, reducing the financial support
for electricity produced in this way to such an extent that planned wind farms
were scrapped by the companies involved.67 Concern for the poor – or at least
concern for the votes of the poor – had begun to take priority over concern for
the environment: a theme which will be explored further in the final section.
Meanwhile, in the United States President Obama has been a consistent
supporter of climate change (the scientific phenomenon) and Climate Change
(its ideological offshoot) for many years. His set-piece major speeches have
been as forceful, elegant and eloquent on this subject as every other that the
great orator expounds. In his 2014 State of the Nation speech he boldly stated:
‘[T]he debate is settled. Climate change is a fact. And when our children’s
children look us in the eye and ask if we did all we could to leave them
a safer, more stable world, with new sources of energy, I want us to be
able to say yes, we did’.68
Like the UNFCCC Obama holds out an idealised vision of the future of the
Earth’s environment expressed in emotive terms around the mental image of
the vulnerable children of future generations; surely the ethical ideal. How-
ever, also like the UNFCCC charter, several IPCC Summaries for Policymakers
and statements by many other major climate change advocates, back to the
Schneider remarks and beyond, Obama’s use of science is oversimplified and
the political challenges are minimised or ignored. ‘Climate change is a fact,’
he says. The words of paleoclimatologist Robert Carter highlight the irrele-
vance of such a comment: ‘Change is simply what climate does’.69 An accu-
rate summary – if one existed – on the relative contributions of natural vari-
65 The Guardian, 14 May 2010.
66 The Guardian, 21 November 2013. See also the Daily Mail, The Telegraph, and The Sun on the
same day.
67 The Sunday Telegraph, 2 March 2014.
68 Barack Obama, 28 January 2014, State of the Union Address, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address, accessed 8
August 2014.
69 Robert M. Carter, Climate: The Counter Consensus (London: Stacey International, 2010) p. 47.
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ation and human behaviour to climate change would be much more helpful.
Stating the obvious is not. Furthermore, holding out an idealised vision of
the future while minimising or ignoring the economic costs, practical difficul-
ties and political obstacles is less than honest, an approach that can only be
deemed ethical if such minor deceptions or omissions are acceptable in pur-
suit of some perceived higher good. Much more interesting and illuminating
were less guarded comments Obama made following his re-election in 2012:
There’s no doubt that for us to take on climate change in a serious way
would involve making some tough political choices, and you know, un-
derstandably, I think the American people right now have been so fo-
cused and will continue to be focused on our economy and jobs and
growth that, you know, if the message is somehow we’re going to ig-
nore jobs and growth simply to address climate change, I don’t think
anybody’s going to go for that.70
Economy, jobs and growth: President Obama’s priorities, and the priority
of every other leader in the world. This rare outbreak of political honesty con-
cerning climate change gets to the heart of the ethical challenge of respond-
ing to climate change: the choice between immediate, tangible economic
threats, with all of the negative consequences that poverty brings, or intan-
gible, undefinable potential future threats. If the contrast between Obama’s
unscripted comments on climate change to journalists, and his public, pol-
ished reference to climate change in his speeches is obvious, it merely echoes
the changing public climate discourse of recent British prime ministers and
other leaders. As well as highlighting the political choices that are required
from national leaders it also maps out the ethical decision-making terrain that
must be negotiated as those hard choices are made.
4 Setting climate policy
The precautionary principle
Any discussion about the ethical aspects of setting climate policy must ad-
dress the primary philosophical argument used by Climate Change advocates
to advance their cause: the precautionary principle. The Wingspread Confer-
ence on the Precautionary Principle described the principle as follows:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environ-
ment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context
70 Barack Obama, 14 November 2012, Press Conference, transcript located at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/14/us/politics/running-transcript-of-president-
obamas-press-conference.html?pagewanted=10& r=0, accessed 5 January 2014.
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the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the bur-
den of proof. The process of applying the Precautionary Principle must
be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected
parties. It must also involve an examination of the full range of alterna-
tives, including no action.71
Depending on one’s political perspective, trust in science, and personal
values, the precautionary principle can be viewed as one of the great achieve-
ments of human thought, or an ideological fraud posing as environmental
concern, or something in between. It has also spawned a huge literature in
its own right, one that would require a separate article to thoroughly review.72
On the positive side, the principle expresses concern for the future of the
planet and the people who will occupy it. Further, the burden of proof falls
on those who want to undertake significant and costly activities to mitigate
future harms. In addition, it is inclusive of all potentially affected parties and
all-encompassing in its range of considered options, although the use of the
word ‘democratic’ connotes a Western liberal influence that may not hold sway
in some parts of the world. More negatively, the ‘burden of proof’ concept is
not quite what it appears. The previous clause of the principle states that it
does not rely on the establishment of scientific evidence to underpin claims of
cause and effect: in other words, proof. Consequently, suggestion of a poten-
tial threat appears to be sufficient to trigger the precautionary principle with-
out the need for scientific evidence of the precise extent of an actual threat.
Climate models are used as the basis of potential threat despite the latest
IPCC Summary for Policymakers explicitly stating that actual events may prove
quite different to the forecasts they provide.73
Hulme takes the idea a step further, adding: ‘Applied to climate change
[the precautionary principle] means that since there is prima facie evidence
that a change in climate would induce some harm (maybe a lot of harm), then
those who would resist efforts to reduce the growth in greenhouse gas emis-
sions have to demonstrate that those avoidable emissions are harmless’.74 So,
on this view not only does the precautionary principle reject the need for es-
tablished evidence when it is invoked, anyone who wishes to challenge the
71 Statement on the Precautionary Principle, Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary
Principle, 26 January 1998, http://www.sehn.org/wing.html, accessed 10 August 2014.
72 For a brief introduction to the issues see Stephen M. Gardiner, ‘A core precautionary prin-
ciple’, Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 14, Issue 1 (2006) pp. 33–60; Michael S. Carolan,
‘The precautionary principle and traditional risk assessment: rethinking how we assess and
mitigate environmental threats’, Organization & Environment, Vol. 20, No. 1 (March 2007)
pp. 5-24; John Quiggin, ‘Complexity, climate change and the precautionary principle’, Envi-
ronmental Health, Vol. 7, No. 3 (200) pp. 15–21.
73 IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers, p. 10, Footnote 14.
74 Hulme, 2011, p. 124.
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principle takes on the burden of proof. Further, Hulme and supporters of his
approach narrow down the parameters of what makes an acceptable chal-
lenge to the precautionary principle approach to mitigation: proof that car-
bon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions cause no harm. This is a false
argument. It is possible, probable even, for someone to accept that the current
and rising levels of carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions are potentially
harmful (though some benefits may accrue, to global vegetation for example)
while still rejecting the precautionary principle as the basis of climate change
policy, and then on ethical grounds.
Once more in this paper, the basis of the ethical choices to be made can be
traced back to the relative importance attached to the natural environment
and the people who occupy it. The precautionary principle has been an ever-
present element of global warming and climate change discourse since the
1980s and was formally incorporated in, for example, the Rio Declaration:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.75
Again, the lack of proof is not to be used as an excuse to avoid action to pre-
vent ‘environmental degradation’. However, this and similar statements reveal
a definite shift in bias over time from concern for humans towards the concern
for the environment. Compare the Rio Declaration’s clear prioritisation of the
environment with the more balanced – between humans and nature – text of
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, which says:
Science and technology, as part of their contribution to economic and
social development, must be applied to the identification, avoidance
and control of environmental risks and the solution of environmental
problems and for the common good of mankind.76
The common good of mankind was given at least equal billing four decades
ago, though that no longer appears to be the case in much climate change
activism and literature. A forceful criticism of this shift in priorities was articu-
75 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development , The United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, 3-14 June 1992, Principle 15, http://www.unep.org/
Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163, accessed 8 August
2014.
76 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, The United Na-
tions Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, http://www.
unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503, accessed
8 August 2014.
28
Ethics and Climate Change Policy
lated by Dr Patrick Moore, an early member of Greenpeace77 who said on BBC
Radio 4: ‘The “green” [in Greenpeace] is the environment and that’s good as
well, but they lost the concern for humans’, before going on to add, ‘they have
turned in, basically, to an evil organisation’.78
The remainder of this section will explore some ethical implications of the
precautionary principle in the choices it advocates, bearing in mind the re-
alpolitik of the global need for energy, the apparent unwillingness of any de-
veloped or developing economy to make significant sacrifices in favour of a
speculative, uncertain future, and the needs of the poorest people on Earth to
economically grow themselves out of starvation, disease and want. Further-
more, even in the richest nations there are millions who are classified as, and
classify themselves as, ‘poor’ and who bear the brunt of the economic and so-
cial costs of decarbonisation policies.
The ethics of decarbonising
Here are several competing elements of the carbon dioxide dilemma:
• anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are at record levels;
• the climate is changing;
• the global economy assumes or aspires to both continued and continual
growth;
• populations demand higher living standards;
• wealth creation emits carbon dioxide;
• renewable energy sources require significant financial subsidies and re-
duce economic competitiveness against those who do not use them.
These conflicting elements are further complicated when assessing the ethics
of climate policy by the following:
• democratically elected leaders cannot sustain unpopular climate poli-
cies in the face of opposition from voters;
• the global economy has not recovered from the 2007–8 financial crisis;
• wealthy countries use more energy than poor ones but the growth of
energy use is greatest in developing countries;
• in 2010 one fifth of the global population was living on less than $1.25
per day (down from two fifths in 1990);79
77 See http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/founders/, accessed 16
October 2014.
78 Patrick Moore, BBC Radio 4 Today programme, 15 October 2014.
79 World Development Indicators 2014. Washington, DC: World Bank. doi:10.1596/978-1-
4648-0163-1. p. 2.
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• fossil fuels are much cheaper to use than renewables;
• new technologies like fracking have vastly increased the amount of po-
tentially available oil and gas over the next century;
• fracked gas has significantly reduced America’s carbon footprint in re-
cent years80;
• many environmentalists and environmentalism groups, especially in Eu-
rope, are vociferously opposed to fracking regardless of any potential
economic or energy security benefits.
The UNFCCC and other global institutions minimise the harsh choices that
must be made – each of which includes ethical as well as political and eco-
nomic elements – in addressing the competing interests I have just identified.
The 2014 World Bank report, for example, sets out two goals: ‘ending extreme
poverty by 2030 and promoting shared prosperity’.81 The humanitarian aim
of poverty eradication is non-controversial even if the desire for increasingly
shared prosperity expresses as much a political as an economic goal, since
it would require a rewiring of the global market-based economy. In keep-
ing with the unwillingness of global institutions to admit the difficulty of the
choices to be made and to identify those who will be made to pay, the World
Bank reports the steps that have been made towards the Millennium Devel-
opment Goal of environmental sustainability, which it describes as ‘improving
people’s lives without depleting natural and humanmade capital stocks’.82 Yet
again the impression is given that poverty can be eradicated without creating
more carbon dioxide. Further, with mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions or
adaptation to climate change being the available tools to deal with the prob-
lem, the precautionary principle and its supporters prioritise the former.
So what are the ethical considerations? Global institutions, especially the
UNFCCC and the IPCC, hold out an idealised ethic where the poor can be made
less poor, economies can develop and resources can be sustained, all with
huge costs in the present and in the future. This ethic is based on a precaution-
ary principle that disavows the need for fully established scientific evidence.
However, to consistently hold out an imagined, improved (or less worse) en-
vironmental future as the ethical ideal without being more direct and honest
about who will pay and how much – the overlooked ethical choices that will
happen at every stage – is intellectually dishonest. Furthermore, it is difficult
to see how such an apparent lack of transparency can support any ethical po-
sition except that of ‘the ends justify the means’.
80 See http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/carbon/, accessed 12 October 2014.
81 Ibid., p. iii.
82 Ibid., p. 8.
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Radical decarbonisation of the world economy is bound to involve heavy
costs. It requires reduced global economic growth, or that at least a propor-
tion of all growth go towards mitigation. The Stern Review of the economics of
climate change was published in 2006 at the behest of the UK’s then Chancel-
lor of the Exchequer and is one, and possibly the most influential, attempt to
frame an economic policy response to climate change.83 The executive sum-
mary of the review states: ‘Such a modelling framework [to reduce the risks
of climate change] has to take into account ethical judgements on the distri-
bution of income and on how to treat future generations.’84 Stern goes on to
link these risks to health (of humans) and the natural environment. The Stern
Review has been persuasively criticised on many grounds, including its treat-
ment of ethical issues.85 The report places a considerably higher value on the
future of the environment and the lives of the future poor in relation to current
values than would be found in either government or industry forward-looking
calculations in fields such as health, education or infrastructure investment.
This is not a hypothetical ethical judgement to be made in the future, it is an
actual ethical judgement made when setting out a preferred model for mak-
ing plans in the present. It is also a judgement that was made at a time of per-
ceived wealth in developed countries, but just as the banking crisis was hitting
the world and the financial bubble that created the perception was about to
burst. Furthermore, the price of oil and gas was on a rapid upward trajectory
that peaked two years later and which has not been matched since.
Stern’s is a perfectly valid position to take, although it would help the lay
observer to position themselves ethically if the relative value of the poorest
in the world in the present, near future and far future were clearly articulated.
The matter is complicated further, ethically speaking, when we consider that
the report originated in a wealthy developed nation, albeit one that has not
felt wealthy to its inhabitants since the financial crisis struck and whose share
of citizens in fuel poverty has risen each year since the Stern Review was pub-
lished. This observation raises one final ethical criticism of the Stern Review:
how ethical can its proposals actually be when they are manifestly undeliver-
able at a political level, its short-term assumptions about the price of oil and
83 ‘Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change: Executive Summary’, 30 October
2006, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/
4/3/Executive Summary.pdf, accessed 17 June 2014.
84 Ibid., p. 9.
85 For examples see Ian Byatt et al., ‘The Stern Review: a dual critique’, World Economics, Vol. 7,
No. 4 (2006) pp. 1-68; William D. Nordhaus, ‘A review of the Stern Review on the Economics
of Climate Change’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XLV (September 2007) pp. 686–702;
and the response, Simon Dietz and Nicholas Stern, ‘Why economic analysis supports strong
action on climate change: a response to the Stern Review’s critics’, Review of Environmental
Economics and Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (2008) pp. 94–113.
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gas skew the calculations, and the climate models on which it relies have re-
peatedly shown themselves to be inadequate for policy purposes? An ide-
alised, expensively achieved future holds little ethical appeal for those pri-
marily concerned for the current hundreds of millions who live, and whose
offspring will continue to live, in life-threatening poverty.
Idealists – and most of the world’s population cannot afford the time or
the money to be one of those – point out that if the rich countries of the
world would agree to be less rich then the poor could be less poor. Part of
me shares those ideals. I would do it as long as everyone else agrees to do
likewise, and therein lies the problem. Pragmatically, electorates in countries
where green policies have been pursued (Germany and the UK, for example)
are now telling their leaders that they will either no longer pay or they want
to reduce the amount they are paying for mitigation schemes. In December
2011 Canada withdrew from the Kyoto agreement because it would cost the
country $14 billion or $1600 from every Canadian family to comply with a pol-
icy that would not lead to global reductions in emissions or reduction in harm
to the environment because of the behaviour of heavily polluting nations like
China and India. Somehow the climate change community – scientists, ac-
tivists, economists, politicians – have managed to produce mitigation policies
that cost huge sums in the present for no discernible current benefit because
so many countries refuse to take targets seriously despite the oft-repeated dire
threats and warnings from the IPCC.
Every indicator I can imagine suggests that a mitigation policy will not
work in practice. For me – and there is no escaping the subjective dimension
of ethics – to ask those living on less than $1.25 per day to remain poor for even
one day longer than necessary is unethical. Only people who have not lived in
or close to drought, famine, starvation and negligible healthcare could even
contemplate such a demand. Prioritisation of concern for the environment
above concern for the poor (to repeat, I know the two are interconnected but
relative priorities must be chosen) would appear to be related to the wealth of
the individuals and nations concerned. Increases in carbon dioxide emissions
are a necessary accompaniment to acceptable growth rates for poor countries.
At the other end of the global wealth spectrum the fat are getting fatter –
literally – while at the same time, in the same developed and developing coun-
tries, fuel poverty is on the increase.86 Confusing the picture somewhat is the
presence of at least hundreds of millions of desperately poor people in China
86 I refer to fuel poverty as defined in the UK’s Hills Review, where households are deemed
to be ‘fuel poor’ if their fuel costs are ‘above average’ and residual income after paying for
fuel is below the official poverty line. See https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
department-of-energy-climate-change/series/fuel-poverty-statistics, accessed 10 August
2014.
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and India, two rising economic powerhouses whose annual growth of carbon
dioxide emissions is greater than the UK’s total output. Further, the relatively
poor exist in every country. For governments to act ethically in the setting
of climate policy, especially with regards to the effects of mitigation on the
poorest nations in the world and on the poorest people in the richer nations,
there should be greater transparency over the scientific doubts that underpin
the advice they receive. Further, they should let their people understand not
only the national targets that are being pursued but the global impact these
will or will not have. Canada withdrew from Kyoto because its previous policy
called for huge costs to be paid with no discernible global decrease in GHG
emissions associated with it. If such costs cannot, or will not, be borne by a
relatively prosperous country like Canada, it is not reasonable to expect them
to be met by poor countries.
Ethics and uncertainty
There is a degree of uncertainty about the extent of temperature increase ris-
ing carbon dioxide emissions will bring87 and not all climate scientists will
even acknowledge the current ‘pause’ in global mean surface temperature
rises, despite this being clear in the figures used by the IPCC.88 Amidst this un-
certainty the IPCC advocates a ‘mix of strategies [to counteract global warm-
ing] that includes mitigation, adaptation, technological development (to en-
hance both adaptation and mitigation) and research.89 However, obfuscation
and avoidance of publicising doubts by scientists and politicians, together
with the political unwillingness of governments over two decades to agree
substantial binding mitigation targets, suggests that adaptation is the more
87 Two perspectives from climate change proponents illustrate this point: James Hansen,
Makiko Sato, Gary Russell and Pushker Kharecha, ‘Climate sensitivity, sea level and atmo-
spheric carbon dioxide’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society. A, Vol. 371, No. 2001
(September 2013) pp. 1–31; Benjamin M. Sanderson, ‘A multimodel study of parametric un-
certainty in predictions of climate response to rising greenhouse gas concentrations’, Jour-
nal of Climate, Vol. 24 (2011) pp. 1362–1377. In contrast, Professor Murry Salby argues that
rising temperatures force carbon dioxide emissions and not vice versa: Murry Salby, 18 April
2013, Hamburg lecture, ‘Relationship between greenhouse gases and global remperature’,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ROw cDKwc0, 12 October 2014.
88 In March 2014 Michel Jarraud, the Secretary General of the World Meteorological Or-
ganization Secretary General, said: ‘I really refuse to accept that we can talk about a
pause.’ http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/mar/31/climate-change-report-
ipcc-governments-unprepared-live-coverage, accessed 7 April 2014.
89 ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’, Working Group II Contribu-
tion to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report, Sum-
mary for Policymakers, 13 April 2007, p. 19.
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realistic option.90 If mitigation is the preferred course of action for ideologi-
cally convinced Climate Change proponents, then adaptation is the pragmatic
choice, practically and ethically. Humans have, for millennia, adapted to cli-
mate change, whether those changes be in response to local extreme weather
events or widespread global climate change. Consequently, the idea of ‘doing
nothing’ is a fallacy. Humans have never done ‘nothing’ about climate change.
They have always sought to adapt, individually and communally, privately or
through commercial or political collectives.
Adaptation, the pragmatic ethical choice, is the one I suggest the world
will eventually gravitate towards, possibly after hundreds of billions of pounds
have been wasted on failed attempts by politicians to agree serious mitigation
targets and cost commitments. It is at least an attainable ethical option. Even
if the IPCC’s scientific forecasts are correct and rising carbon dioxide emissions
lead to the upper range of modelled temperature rises, even if vastly expen-
sive mitigation activities and costs are somehow agreed, despite all the indi-
cations that they will not be, even if mitigation actually limits emissions and
the associated temperature rises, and if it transpires that solar and other non
GHG-related activities are not significant factors in global warming and an-
thropogenic climate change, adaptation will still be necessary anyway. Priori-
tising adaptation will provide the greatest likelihood of using global resources
most efficiently.
With all of the uncertainties that characterise the frequently claimed con-
sensus on climate change it is beyond the realms of the possible for scientists
to predict whether – even in the event of massive mitigation efforts in the com-
ing decades – the Bosna River in Bosnia Herzegovina, for example will or will
not catastrophically flood again like it did in 2014.91 They cannot reassure the
Bosnian people that if they spend billions of Euros in mitigation every year for
20 or 30 years that the Sava River will be safe or that the Orahovacko River or
some other river will not burst its banks and cause deadly mud slides. Similarly,
the can give Africans no comfort as to whether previously fertile parts of the
Sahel region to the south of the Sahara will avoid desertification, and so on.
Demonstrable, uncontested proof – rather than suspicion or even informed
90 There are no universally agreed definitions of the terms ‘mitigation’ and ‘adaptation’. A com-
prehensive overview can be found at Dale Jamieson, ‘Adaptation, Mitigation, and Justice’
in Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson and Henry Shue (eds) Climate Ethics:
Essential Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp. 263–283. From an extensive
literature see also John Smithers and Barry Smit, ‘Human adaptation to climatic variability
and change’, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (July 1997) pp. 129–146.
91 The Budapest Beacon, 13 June 2014, http://budapestbeacon.com/featured-articles/
bosnia-herzegovina-struggles-to-recover-from-devastating-floods-landslides/, accessed
10 August 2014.
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opinion – that events like these are becoming more frequent compared to the
sweep of human history is not available.
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report acknowledges climate uncertainties,
stating: ‘Costs and benefits of climate change for industry, settlement, and so-
ciety will vary widely by location and scale,’ although it goes on to add that
the greater the change in climate the more negative the net effects will be.92
However, some claims go much further, based on the assumption ‘that human
activity causes climate change; that climate change harms people’.93 Even if
the claim that human behaviour causes climate change is accepted, the role
of natural climate variability is often overlooked and complexities are over-
simplified. The global climate has changed hugely since the last ice age, yet
many of the changes have been largely beneficial for the human race and for
countless non-human species. Overstatement complicates the already diffi-
cult challenge of ethical decision-making in relation to climate change policy.
Consider a positive example. On a visit to South Luangwa, Zambia I asked
a 55-year-old indigenous, non-commercial farmer how climate change was
affecting his crops. He told me he had just enjoyed the best decade of rainy
seasons in his lifetime and that his few small fields had produced their best
crops ever. ‘If this is climate change I want more!’ was his rather, to me, sur-
prising response. Was it true? I do not know – and even if it was it was unlikely
to be representative of every area of that large country. However, further re-
search shows that in every year between 2009 and 2014 Zambia has produced
more maize than in any year since 1961;94 a lot more maize. The 2014 total of
3.35 million metric tonnes is four times greater than the highest production
in any year in the 1960s and 1970s before the late twentieth century global
warming. It is eight times greater than production in 1964, 1972 and 1974.95 If
the farmer’s comment was true, will it remain true for future decades? Nobody
can know that either. These statistics on Zambian maize production are shock-
92 ‘Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’, WGII AR4, Summary for Pol-
icymakers, p. 7.
93 Elizabeth Cripps, ‘Climate change, collective harm and legitimate coercion’, Critical Review of
International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 2 (March 2011) p. 171. Cripps offers
a philosophical analysis from a liberal perspective that has significant merit on theoretical
grounds but faces significant practical implementation obstacles.
94 Zambia Corn Production by Year, http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=
zm&commodity=corn&graph=production, accessed 12 August 2014. Figures from the US
Department of Agriculture. In addition see statement by Zambian Agriculture and Livestock
Minister Wilbur Simuusa, 5 May 2014, http://www.lusakatimes.com/2014/05/05/zambia-
bumper-harvest-20132014-production-estimates-show-23-jump-maize-output/, ac-
cessed 12 August 2014. Numerous factors will have contributed to these increases but it
goes without saying that maize cannot be grown without adequate rainfall.
95 Ibid.
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ing: shocking because of the scale of the increase and shocking that I had not
previously come across this positive news amidst the disaster and foreboding
of climate change literature generally. Anecdotes are not evidence but they
can remind us of the complexities of climate-related studies and the impor-
tance of honest and transparent public climate change discourse that does
not downplay any potential benefits in a drive to scare people into action.
There will still need to be adaptation no matter what level of mitigation
takes place in the coming years. At least adaptation will have one advantage:
the problems will be before people’s eyes and it will be easier to motivate a
response than when asking for major financial sacrifices on the unseeable and
precisely unknowable. In turn, this leads to another philosophical choice, and
it is a choice that will tilt the ethical preference towards mitigation or towards
adaptation: whether ethical priority should be attached to actual events or
anticipated events, especially bearing in mind the uncertainties involved and
the health warning the 2014 IPCC Summary for Policymakers gives the climate
models it uses in its forecasts.96
So how are ethical decisions to be made in the face of repeated claims
to scientific and political consensus, unknown unknowns within that claimed
consensus, known unknowns (the ifs, buts, doubts and caveats) that are min-
imised by the consensus for presentational purposes, and also many known
knowns that are either model-based (caveats apply) or suffused with subjec-
tive ideological, social, political or other environmental interests? There is not
the space here to fully explore the idea, but suggest that there needs to be
some link maintained between ethics, truth and politics, or ethics, knowledge
and politics.
Some individuals on the range of climate concern – from agnostic to cau-
tious to alarmist – may be able to justify to themselves an ethical position on
climate change and climate change policy that will overlook error, ignorance,
oversight, less than full disclosure or even downright untruths, as long as it is in
support of a long-term future ideal in which they have a sufficiently strong be-
lief, for example, that deep mitigation measures will lead to the best outcome
for the environment and possibly for the highest number of people as well.
The operative word here is ‘belief’, a word that belongs more to the realms of
faith, religion or ideology rather than to science and proof. However, I would
suggest that the strongest, most practical ethical approach is that which bal-
ances the pursuit of ‘good’ or idealistic goals with appropriate conduct along
the way, namely a commitment to truth and knowledge, and openness about
the extent of our knowledge. However, this approach may limit the ambition
and scope of climate change policy because of the uncertainties and the po-
96 IPCC, 2014: Summary for Policymakers, p. 10, Footnote 14.
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litical interests involved.
Put more crudely, setting mitigation policy goals that cannot and will not
be met, either because they are aiming beyond the scope of the knowable
and do-able or because national political interests make them unrealistic and
unattainable, is itself in practice less ethical than setting goals that are lower,
but more readily achievable. I assume here that the greater the speculation
and uncertainties involved, the weaker the ethical claim. Conversely, as the
certainty increases, the stronger the ethical claim. If it is not apparent already,
I am suggesting that a commitment to mitigation policies has a reduced ethi-
cal claim because of the unknowns and unknowables involved, whether those
unknowns concern the future of the environment or the future of the poor-
est citizens on Earth. An ethical commitment to adaptation is at least rooted
in actual events as they occur. To be clear, this is a commitment to actively
preparing to respond to major climate-related events as they occur: develop-
ing technologies and skills as well as setting monies aside in dedicated funds,
both nationally and globally. Governments and individuals have always done
this through, for example, contingency funds.
As I have previously argued, adaptation will need to happen anyway, re-
gardless of any mitigation activities and costs. National leaders have already
decided that they cannot afford the degree of mitigation recommended by
the IPCC, the Stern Review and others, either financially or politically. They
are just delaying the moment of truth by fudging the outcomes of a series of
climate change summits, with Paris 2015 already looking likely to end with
obfuscation, recriminations and an earnest commitment to future talks about
talks about doing something, as soon as everyone else does more.
The approach of the IPCC, UNFCCC and other institutions is to demand,
or at least to try and scare people and governments into, global mitigation
policies. Even Kyoto did not come close to meeting that aspiration, and it
has been left to wither on the political vine. Mitigation policies can only be
agreed at national levels, with each country deciding what it can and will do. A
much more realistic approach would be for the IPCC and other climate change
bodies to formally abandon mitigation. Practically and politically it is happen-
ing already in slow motion. That leaves countries to prepare for adaptation,
with the wealthier helping the poorer as circumstances dictate. Every coun-
try, community, industry, business and individual that has ever been struck by
natural disaster has adapted as best they could with the resources available,
and even the most expensive insurance policy on the market does not protect
against every conceivable danger.97 The ethics of this approach to climate
97 Matthew Rendall explores the related moral considerations in ‘Climate change and the
threat of disaster: the moral case for taking out insurance at our grandchildren’s expense’,
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policy are pragmatic rather than idealised. They will not satisfy those who
are true climate alarmists and who have unstated ideological ambitions such
as anti-capitalism or wealth redistribution enmeshed with their ideas for the
mitigation of climate change, though they may be acceptable to the merely
climate concerned. Because of the political capital that has already been in-
vested and the limits of what is politically achievable, one practical outcome
is likely to be a combination of ‘thin’ global climate change mitigation policies
where they can be agreed (so that governments are not seen to be completely
backtracking), and ‘thick’ domestic adaptation. I maintain my argument that
lower, achievable and practical climate policy goals are inherently more ethi-
cal than idealised, unachievable climate policies whose basis is shot through
with uncertainty, wishful thinking and unstated ideological pursuits.
The moral hazard warning
Good intentions and motivations provide no protection against bad outcomes
in any field, including the implementation of climate change policies. Worse,
financial incentives have been used in climate change mitigation policies –
implemented with the best of intentions and under scientific advice – that
have actively contributed to environmental and individual harms, which they
are surely meant to avoid. Moral hazard has resulted. Consider two examples:
the German shift to renewable energy, and the encouragement of biofuel as
a replacement for fossil fuels.
In the latter half of the 2000s, motivated by concerns about climate change
and the reliability of future energy supplies as ‘peak oil’ was widely declared
to be near, and under the influence of green lobbying, Germany embraced
renewable energy technologies to a greater extent than any other country
in Europe and possibly the world. Ambitious plans for a renewables-based
economy were set out for a country whose economic might and manufactur-
ing base is built on energy-intensive industries. To encourage investment in
renewables, the German government was an early implementer of generous
subsidies for wind and solar power. When in September 2010 Angela Merkel
committed Germany to highly ambitious renewable energy targets she was
seen by some, perhaps many, to be pursuing the green ideal. The goals be-
came even more ambitious when in 2011, in response to the Fukushima nu-
clear disaster, Merkel and Germany opted to take nuclear electricity genera-
tion out of its energy mix by not extending the lives of its operating reactors
and closing any that were under repair or due for repair. Major investors were
happy to embrace the green dream and German consumers seemed happy to
play their part.
Political Studies Vol. 59 (2011) pp. 884–899.
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The costs of this energy gamble would be borne by industry and individual
consumers. This was a necessary price to pay in pursuit of a good and impor-
tant cause, or so ran the argument. However, the aftermath of the global finan-
cial crisis began to impact upon Germany’s seemingly indestructible economy
and a bonanza in fracked oil and gas in the US lowered energy prices signif-
icantly on the other side of the Atlantic. Voters began to protest about the
subsidy escalators that would automatically increase their energy bills above
any commercial or inflationary increases. Worse, energy intensive industries
began to look to the US as a cost-effective, more profitable location to do busi-
ness. Between 2009 and 2013 BASF, the German chemicals giant, moved $5.7
billion in investments to America.98 As subsidies became more generous so
more companies invested, up to the point at which the German government
sought to reduce the increasingly unaffordable tariffs paid to vendors of so-
lar power. Since 2011 the installation of solar panels has fallen markedly, in
parallel with reduced tariffs; simultaneously, major solar panel producers and
installers have gone bankrupt. One survivor, SMA Solar, Germany’s largest so-
lar company, announced major job cuts and profit warnings in 2014.99
However, the environmental news gets worse. Germany now has an en-
ergy gap, partly caused by the withdrawal of nuclear power, partly by the
sun and wind not blowing and shining enough in northern Europe neces-
sitating conventionally-generated backup power, partly because the energy
sums never properly added up in the first place, and all exacerbated by increas-
ing tensions with Russia, a key gas supplier. This gap has been filled by coal,
the most carbon-intensive of the conventional energy options. In 2013 Ger-
many’s generation of electricity from lignite – brown coal – reached its high-
est level since 1990, counteracting reductions in the carbon footprint achieved
through renewable energy use. Perversely, German households will pay a sur-
charge of e220 in 2014 to provide the e23.5 billion in subsidies that incen-
tivise investment in renewable energy, while at the same time electricity man-
ufacturers are incentivised to keep burning coal to maximise profits and keep
the lights on.100 David Buchan’s detailed analysis of what he calls ‘Germany’s
gamble’ concludes that the country might manage to meet one of its targets
98 Michael Birnbaum, 1 April 2012, The Washington Post, ‘European Industry Flocks to U.S. for
Cheaper Natural Gas’, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/european-industry-
flocks-to-cheap-us-gas/2013/04/01/454d06ea-8a2c-11e2-98d9-3012c1cd8d1e story.
html, accessed 12 August 2014.
99 Reuters, 30 July 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/07/30/uk-sma-solar-warning-
idUKKBN0FZ1A720140730, accessed 12 August 2014.
100‘Green Revolution? German Brown Coal Power Output Hits New High’, 7 January 2014,
Spiegel Online International, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/researchers-
alarmed-at-rise-in-german-brown-coal-power-output-a-942216.html, accessed 14 Au-
gust 2014.
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– producing one third of its electricity demands from renewables by 2020 –
but it is unlikely to cut energy consumption by its target of one fifth or reduce
overall emissions by that time.101
Consider these actions from an ethical perspective. The policy to switch
from conventional fuels to renewable energies has an ethical basis in want-
ing to reduce environmental harm – through mitigation – both now and in
the future. It would do so by reducing emissions of carbon dioxide into the
atmosphere in response to Climate Change scientific recommendations and
lobbying by activists pursuing their ethical ideal of a cleaner environmental
future. Further, the decision to close or not reopen German nuclear power sta-
tions after the Fukushima disaster was also, at some level, no doubt based on
well-intended concern for the environment. At another level, however, it was
a politically-motivated compromise response to effective green activism and
opposition, as Merkel and her government sought to reinforce their positions.
In addition, Germany’s decision to ban fracking until 2020 marked another vic-
tory for environmental campaigners and their commitment to preserving ‘the
environment’. How could all of those idealistic, mostly well-intended actions
and policies be anything other than ethical? Answer: if, when combined, they
increase the greenhouse gas emissions that they were meant to prevent in the
first place. Ironically, the IPCC has acknowledged that the use of clean-burning
gas of the kind obtained through fracking can help to reduce emissions if it re-
places more carbon-intensive coal.102 Consequently, the pursuit of green poli-
cies that end up not reducing carbon dioxide emissions, while charging the
poorest in German society for the privilege, creates a moral hazard.
A second example, and one with more immediate impact upon the global
poor, emerges from the push towards the use of biofuels as more environmen-
tally friendly alternatives to fossil fuels. In 2005 the United States passed the
Energy Policy Act (EPAct), which implemented the Renewable Fuel Standard
(RFS) and required, initially, 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuel to be blended
into gasoline by 2012.103 This was upgraded in 2007 by RFS2, which required
that 36 billion gallons of renewable fuel be blended into gasoline and diesel
by 2022.104 Where government targets are set and legislated for in this way,
a predictable market is created and the conditions are therefore in place for
investment and transition to the required economic output. Further, if biofuel
101David Buchan, ‘The Energiewende – Germany’s gamble’, The Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies, June 2012, p. 1, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/
06/SP-261.pdf, accessed 12 August 2014.
102The Times, 13 April 2014.
103‘Renewable Fuel Standard’, United States Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.
epa.gov/otaq/fuels/renewablefuels/, accessed 13 August 2014.
104 Ibid.
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production pays better than food production then commercial farmers are in-
centivised towards growing crops for the former rather than the latter.
If crops are funnelled into vehicle engines they are not funnelled into hu-
man stomachs, which is not a problem if there is sufficient food to go round
and at a price the poor can afford. By 2007 grain prices were rising and the
UN’s World Food Programme issued warnings about not being able to afford
to feed 90 million of the most desperate people in the world. It also voiced con-
cern about a further 850 million people who were suffering from hunger.105 In
2008 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called for a review of biofuel policies
as a result of their impact on global food prices.106 The ‘moral dilemma’ con-
tinued, however, although it is not a moral dilemma for anyone who thinks the
starving should be fed before carbon emissions are reduced, whether biofuels
achieve that or not.
Events in 2012 caused a rethink about the relative priority of emission mit-
igation or feeding the global poor. That year a major drought hit both the
US and Russia, causing major disruption to grain production and by July 2012
45% of the US corn crop was rated between poor and very poor condition.107
Consequently, global food prices spiked upwards as demand outstripped sup-
ply and commodities traders saw an opportunity to maximise profits. A well-
intended policy that aimed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, but the ef-
fectiveness of which was disputed, managed to definitely push millions more
people into hunger. The 2012 Global Food Policy Report confirmed that the
drought, together with the use of crops for biofuel, resulted in a 25% increase
in corn prices between June and August that year.108 In 2013 the organisation
ActionAid launched a ‘Food not Fuel’ campaign in an attempt to stop Mem-
bers of the European Parliament from voting in new regulations that would
have required an increasing amount of food to be burned as fuel.109
The 2014 IPCC Working Group III Summary for Policymakers acknowledges
that the use of biofuels raises questions of its sustainability as well as of its
negative impacts on food security and prices:
Bioenergy can play a critical role for mitigation, but there are issues to
consider, such as the sustainability of practices and the efficiency of bioen-
105‘UN warns it cannot afford to feed the world’, Financial Times, 15 July 2007.
106‘UN chief calls for review of biofuels policy’, The Guardian, 5 April 2008, http://www.
theguardian.com/environment/2008/apr/05/biofuels.food, accessed 14 August 2014.
107‘Agricultural Weather and Drought Update’ 23 July 2012, United States Department of Agri-
culture, http://blogs.usda.gov/2012/07/23/agricultural-weather-and-drought-update-
%E2%80%93-72312/, accessed 14 August 2014.
1082012 Global Food Policy Report, International Food Policy Research Institute, p. 3, http://
www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/gfpr2012.pdf, accessed 14 August 2014.
109‘Food Not Fuel’, ActionAid, http://www.actionaid.org.uk/food-not-fuel?slide=1, accessed
14 August 2014.
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ergy systems. . .Barriers to large-scale deployment of bioenergy include
concerns about [greenhouse gas] emissions from land, food security, wa-
ter resources, biodiversity conservation and livelihoods. The scientific
debate about the overall climate impact related to land-use competition
effects of specific bioenergy pathways remains unresolved.110
The politics of climate change policy are interesting when these words
from the Summary for Policymakers are set alongside concerns raised about
biofuels in the main Technical Report:
[C]ommodity prices remain high and volatile despite sluggish economic
growth in major parts of the world economy. High costs for food have
amplified concerns about competition between food production and ef-
forts to mitigate emissions, notably through the growing of bioenergy
crops.111
The Summary for Policymakers appears to have toned down the concerns
about high food costs and the relative priority of food production against the
mitigation of emissions. While it is encouraging that the IPCC have acknowl-
edged this ethical dilemma, there still appears to be a bias towards helping
the environment by mitigating climate change through the use of biofuels
(again, a contested concept) over helping the hungry poor. A leaked draft
of the assessment was reported to have been even more critical, apparently
stating: ‘Increasing bioenergy crop cultivation poses risks to ecosystems and
biodiversity.’112 Ethical choices are to be made not only between the relative
importance of the poor and the environment but also on the degree to which
such concerns are brought to the attention of governments and populations
by the IPCC.
What is beyond question, however, is that the shift towards biofuels has
had damaging consequences, both for the poor and for the environment, and
there is no convincing evidence that it has achieved any significant lowering of
carbon emissions once all the variables have been taken into account. Further,
deforestation of crucial areas of the world, especially the Amazon, in order to
grow biofuel crops cannot be the basis of a long-term solution to the problem
of greenhouse emissions. Again, when a policy exacerbates the very thing
that it is meant to be solving then a moral hazard occurs: only in this case with
direct impact on the hungry poor as well as on the natural environment.
110IPCC WGIII AR5 Summary for Policymakers, 2014, p. 26.
111IPCC Working Group III, Mitigation of Climate Change: WGIII Assessment Report 5 Fi-
nal Draft, p. 11. Located at http://report.mitigation2014.org/drafts/final-draft-postplenary/
ipcc wg3 ar5 final-draft postplenary full.pdf, accessed 10 August 2014.
112Sunday Telegraph, 23 March 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/10716756/
Biofuels-do-more-harm-than-good-UN-warns.html, accessed 11 August 2014.
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5 Conclusion
Ethical considerations have arisen and continue to arise at every stage of cli-
mate concern, from the climate science that first identified global warming
as a potential problem for the world to the current and future implementa-
tion of proposed climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. Since
the 1970s climate change scientists have been encouraged to choose an ethi-
cal priority: conform to the long-established norms and moral codes of scien-
tific practice – especially disinterestedness – or relegate those concerns below
a perceived higher ‘end’ of saving the world from global-warming-induced
catastrophe. Many climate scientists, though not all, have opted to some de-
gree for the latter, adopting a post-normal scientific paradigm that overtly in-
cludes personal, ideological and political elements and limits public exposure
to the ifs, ands, buts, doubts and caveats that inevitably characterise all sci-
entific research. Such an approach, perhaps necessarily, prioritises consen-
sus over hard-to-come-by definitive proof, although what consensus exists is
predicated on computer models whose findings, the IPCC concedes, may not
match actual climate events in the future. Furthermore, that consensus is pro-
tected by a willingness on the part of some, hopefully just a small minority,
to resort to clearly unethical methods to coerce scientists like Lennart Bengts-
son away from questioning any aspect of the climate consensus that has so
far been reached, and despite the appearance of intriguing anomalies like the
current 16–18-year pause in global mean surface temperature rises.
In the framing of climate mitigation or adaptation policies a choice may
eventually have to be made between prioritising the environment or priori-
tising concern for the people who live in it, especially the global poor. This
ethical choice has been consistently and repeatedly underplayed in global
institutional climate change discourse for more than two decades. The oft-
repeated ideal of mitigating climate change while at the same time achiev-
ing strong economic growth and feeding the poor has obscured the realities
of the harsh political and ethical choices to be made at individual, national
and global levels. However, close examination of IPCC and other key reports
indicates a preference for protecting the environment even at the cost of in-
creased or extended poverty for millions of vulnerable people in the present
and near future in particular. For some this is motivated by a genuine belief
that the better the environment is protected the better the quality of life for
all people in the future. For others, however, there is an antipathy towards the
human race, captured in the phrase: ‘The real enemy then is humanity itself’.113
Furthermore, recent mitigation policies in the UK and Germany, for exam-
ple, have burdened the poor in those countries with increased energy costs
113King and Schneider, 1991, p. 75.
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and enriched individual and institutional investors in the attempt to constrain
greenhouse gas emissions. Meanwhile the increases in carbon dioxide out-
put in China and India overwhelm what now seem like token mitigation ef-
forts elsewhere. Ironically, a combination of good ethical intentions – in Ger-
many in particular – has resulted in the worst of all worlds. A moral hazard has
emerged whereby an aggressive push towards renewable technologies has
resulted in both increased poverty, climbing carbon emissions through the
increased burning of brown coal, and rising costs to industry that are sending
companies with high energy requirements overseas. Even worse, the pursuit
of biofuels has prompted the UN Secretary General, the World Food Program
and numerous NGOs to express concern about using food to run engines, with
the associated demand-led price rises, instead of feeding the global poor. The
impacts of biofuels on world food availability and cost violate the UNFCCC Ar-
ticle 2, which requires ‘that food production is not threatened’.114 Only an in-
dividual or organisation who places a distinct or absolute ethical priority on
protecting the environment at any cost could deliberately countenance this
extended human poverty and suffering. This should not be taken as a charter
for unconstrained environmental harm, only a plea for balance, transparency,
honesty and achievability in the selection of climate change policies.
Finally, the degree of uncertainty to be found in all IPCC predictions has a
direct impact on the strength of associated ethical claims. The stronger and
more accurate the truth or knowledge concerning climate harm, the more
credibility the ethical choices associated with it. The uncertainties surround-
ing mitigation policies – what exactly will they stop, where, and for how long –
suggest that adaptation policies will be needed in addition anyway. I have ar-
gued in this paper that the ethical choice to be made is not between an imag-
ined climate ideal and a decision to do nothing. Every climate negotiation so
far has fallen far short of achieving the mitigation espoused by its advocates
and falls increasingly short with every new round of discussions as political
and economic realities bite. The pragmatic ethical choice is to enact adapta-
tion policies – with wealthier nations supporting poorer nations – while recog-
nising that the future will bring as-yet unidentified challenges. Governments
have traditionally operated contingency funds for use in responding to emer-
gencies. Some climate-concerned citizens may be more reassured if part of
this money is specifically allocated to climate or weather adaptation. Caution
is needed however. If every economic, social and nature-related problem in
the world is blamed on climate change then the very definition will become
114United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, Article 2, http://
unfccc.int/essential background/convention/background/items/1353.php, accessed 4 Au-
gust 2014.
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useless. Indeed this may well be the case already. If everything is the fault of
climate change then, to all intents and purposes, nothing is the fault of climate
change. In all of this, ethically robust climate science should be continuously
challenging itself and its consensus from the inside. The best, most ethical and
enduring policy outcomes will be achieved through the protection and appli-
cation of the scientific norms that have achieved so much in recent centuries
and still define science beyond the realms of climate change.
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